Other darkest hours



Excerpted from
March of the Titans:
A History of the White Race

by Arthur Kemp:


The first great race war – Attila the Hun

The Goths and their racial cousins kept up a continuous localized war with the Romans for many years, and would have doubtless continued to do so for even longer had a new powerful racial foe not emerged which threatened to destroy the Goths, Germans, Romans and indeed all of Europe.


Alans – The first victims

Physically described by Romans as being “short, brown skinned and slant eyed” the Huns emerged from Central Asia and burst upon the easternmost Whites, a tribe called the Alans, in 372 AD. The Alans, a Nordic tribe still living in the ancestral homeland between the Black and Caspian Seas, were crushed by the Huns who had developed cavalry fighting to a fine skill. Remnants of the Alans fled south and west—to this day there are traces of this last Nordic tribe to be found amongst the present day inhabitants of the region.

The Alans who fled westwards sought refuge with the Ostrogoths, bringing with them the first news of the new Asiatic terror.


Ostrogoths fall before Hun invasion

If the Ostrogoths wondered what had befallen the Alans, they did not have to wait long to find out. Very soon the Huns swept even further west and invaded the Ostrogothic lands (in modern day western Russia) and defeated them as well.

The Ostrogothic king, Hermanric, committed suicide when the scale of the invasion became apparent, and his successor, Vitimer, was killed while trying to hold back the Huns. The Ostrogothic kingdom in western Russia disintegrated, and its survivors streamed further westwards, into the lands of the Visigoths and Slavs.


Above is a depiction of a scene which befell hundreds of thousands of Whites. A raiding non-White party attacks a Roman villa, killing the males and carrying off the White women for sexual slavery.



Athanaric, king of the Visigoths, engaged the Huns at the Dniester River in modern day Bulgaria, but the Huns defeated the Visigothic army as well. After this defeat, the Visigoths were forced to fall back and beg the Romans for permission to settle inside Roman territory.

This appeal was made all the more remarkable when it is borne in mind that the Romans and Visigoths had been at virtual constant war for near enough to two centuries. So when the Romans finally gave permission to the Visigoths to move into Roman territory, it was at a terrible price—the Visigoths had to surrender all their weapons and hand over large numbers of their women and children as hostages.

Crossing the Danube in 376 AD and settling in modern day Bulgaria, the Visigoths managed to gain a temporary reprieve from the ravages of the Huns. The conditions under which the Romans forced them to stay were such that it was not long before Visigothic resentment boiled over into open rebellion.

The Visigoths secretly re-armed themselves and launched a campaign against the Roman strongholds of Thrace and Macedonia in northern Greece. Finally, in the battle of Hadrianople (378 AD) in modern day Greece, a Visigothic army defeated a Roman army under the personal command of the Emperor Valens—who had been the one to impose the harsh conditions of refuge upon the Visigoths. Valens himself was killed in this battle.

The defeat was all the more ironic as a large number of the Roman army’s soldiers were in fact Gothic mercenaries. The Eastern Roman Empire then accepted the presence of the Visigoths in central Europe, and lifted many of the restrictions placed upon them by Valens.

While the Goths and the Romans were grappling with one another, the former Visigothic lands were being seized by the Huns.

By the time of the Battle of Hadrianople, the Huns had occupied most of Dacia, the land originally seized by the Visigoths from Romans (and which corresponds to the present day country of Rumania).

Europe almost entirely invaded

At this stage the racial balance of Europe could have swung decisively in favor of the Asiatic Mongolians—all the original White ancestral homelands had been either destroyed or occupied by the Huns.

In addition to this, the Huns also physically occupied large parts of western Russia and portions of central and eastern Europe, including entire portions of modern central Germany, Hungary and Rumania, turning them overnight into mini Asiatic states.

Not content with these conquests, the Asiatic Huns began pushing further westwards, causing entire nations to be moved and destroying virtually everything in their path.

In this way the remnants of the Alans, and many other minor Nordic tribes were forced westwards, in turn displacing other already settled tribes. It was this displacement which led to further migrations of assorted Germanic tribes into Spain and even as far as North Africa.

By 432 AD, during the reign of Roman Emperor Theodosius I, the Huns had increased their power base and stranglehold on eastern and parts of central Europe to the point where they actually collected a large annual tribute from Rome. (By this time Rome was totally dependent on “barbarian” or German and Gaulish mercenaries for its defense—the mostly mixed race population of Rome had long since lost any social cohesiveness and ability to provide recruits for the army).

Attila the Hun – brutal leader

In 433 AD, the Huns gained a new king, whose name would become a byword for the Asiatic terror—Attila.

The new Asiatic king established his headquarters at the village of Buda on the Danube River in 445 AD (Buda was later to combine with another village on the other side of the river, Pest, to become Budapest, the modern capital of Hungary).

By this time the Hunnish empire stretched from the Caspian Sea in the east right up to the North Sea. In all of the area the Huns carried out a vicious racial war of extermination against the Whites who militarily were too weak to resist. Countless White settlements were wiped out, with the women routinely being carried off into captivity.

In 452 AD, Attila began moving west again, with the intention of seizing France and finishing off all of Europe.

Hunnish blood enters eastern Europe

By this stage the Huns had started on a limited scale to physically integrate with sections of the peoples they had conquered. Traces of the Mongolian influence can still be seen amongst some peoples in eastern Europe (the so called “Slavic look” which in fact is not Slavic at all, but mixed Mongolian/Slavic.)

Possibly as a result of this limited integration process, the Huns managed to recruit some locals into their army, and units of various eastern European tribes found themselves in the Hunnish army which finally invaded France. They were dealt with extremely harshly by their distant racial cousins if captured. The vast majority of the Hunnish army were however Mongolian and under the ultimate leadership of the unquestionably militarily astute Attila.

The Huns stood poised to push through to the Atlantic Ocean—Europe stood on the very brink of extermination.

The Battle of Troyes – Whites unite to defeat the Asiatics

The threat of the Hunnish army finally forced the ever squabbling Romans and Visigoths into an united front. A Roman army, under the last of the Western Empire’s properly Roman generals, Aetius, joined up with a Visigoth army under their king, Theodoric I, and together they met the Hunnish army in central France near the present day city of Troyes in 451 AD.

In a day long battle, both sides inflicted heavy casualties on the other, with the Visigoth king, Theodoric, being killed in the fighting. By nightfall the combined White army had gained the upper hand over the Asians.

Attila was forced to retreat all the way across Europe as far as Hungary, exacting a terrible revenge in slaughter and looting from those White settlements unfortunate enough to be in his path of retreat.

Defeated in the west, Attila made one last attempt to destroy the Whites. In 452 the Asians invaded northern Italy and razed the city of Aqueila to the ground, massacring as many of the inhabitants as they could find (the survivors fled into the nearby marshes, there to later establish the city of Venice).

Suddenly in 453 AD, the sixty year-old Attila died—allegedly of a burst blood vessel incurred during his wedding night exertions following his marriage to a local German princess. (How much of that story is true is open to question: what is fact is that he took a blond German girl, named Hildico, as his wife, following an example set by many of his Mongolian warriors, whose genetic footprint can be seen on some faces in eastern Europe and Russia to this day.)

The Battle of Nedao – Germanics save the white race from extinction

Attila’s death was the signal for a revolt of the people subjugated by the Huns. In 454 AD, the Goths, Slavs and others in Europe who had managed to survive the nearly 70 years of cruel Asiatic rule, rose up and at the battle of Nedao in that year, defeated the Huns in a straight fight between a Mongolian and a Germanic army. The victory was total and the Huns were finally destroyed.

The battle of Nedao became one of the most significant battles in White history, for without it Europe would most likely have been completely overrun by Asiatics before 500 AD.

The Germans, as victors over the Huns, became famous amongst their Indo-European racial cousins, with the Icelandic word for German to this day translating literally as “peoples’ defender”.

Suffering total defeat at the hands of the Germans, the vast majority of the surviving Asiatic Huns then fled back into the Far East, to the Sea of Azov in Russia—fearing the retribution by the Whites that would follow (a fear which was fully justified, as the enraged and victorious Whites mercilessly put to death any bands of Hun stragglers they found).

The Hunnish legacy

However, the Huns left two significant things behind them—firstly they gave their name to the area which had functioned as their headquarters during their racial war, Hungary.

Secondly, some admixture of Mongolian genes occurred amongst the Slavic tribes which had been under the Asiatic Hunnish occupation for nearly 80 years. This was however by no means complete and only ultimately affected a small, but significant, number of the Indo-European Slavs.

The Slavs then expanded eastward into the regions of Russia which had been overrun by the Huns on their way west. There they also mixed with scattered remnants of the partly Hunnish, partly Slavic peoples the Huns had left behind.

All these mixes contributed towards creating the distinctive Russian “Slavic look” visible to this day in a small percentage of the eastern European population in Russia and elsewhere.

The greatest effect of the Hunnish invasion of Europe was however the extinction of the source of the Indo-European tribes from their ancestral homeland between the Black and Caspian Seas. Never again would this territory produce another Indo-European Nordic tribe—the fountain of new Nordic tribes was forever extinguished, one of the most significant acts of racial genocide ever seen.


The second great race war – the Crusades

• By 700 AD, Islamic armies had occupied North Africa and had destroyed what remained of the Gothic Vandal state.

• As the Crusaders approached Antioch [during the siege of that city], the Muslim defenders under Turcoman Yagji-Shah started killing all the remaining Whites in the city, along with any non-White Christians who had the misfortune to be present… By nightfall of 3 June 1099, the city was in White hands—and every non-White who had foolishly remained behind in the city was dead.

• By the time they [the Crusaders] got to Constantinople however, the wonder on the European faces must have been apparent—they appeared to have as little in common with the Byzantine Empire as with the Muslims, not only racially, but even in language. The Byzantine Christians did not recognize the Pope, spoke Greek instead of Latin and had distinctly Middle Eastern art and architectural forms.

Unlike the Hebrews’ ethnic cleansing policies recounted in the Old Testament, in the Crusades westerners committed the same mistake of all white conquests throughout history, even after capturing Jerusalem. Kemp writes:

However, the Crusader states did not try to change the population make-up of the region by enforced migration or expulsion—nor did they even try to convert the natives. So it was that the first European colonies were created: ironically in the areas where once their now very distant racial cousins had once walked… The Crusaders’ failure to majority populate the areas they conquered with their own racial kind led to their disappearance in a very short while—so that now only their vast empty buildings stand as monuments to the spirit and heroism of the times.

In the 2011, printed edition of his book Kemp adds this phrase about the Crusades:

Never a majority, the white Christian soldiers were overrun, and within three hundred years almost all trace was vanished.


The third great race war – the Moors invade Europe

The invasion of Western Europe by a non-White Muslim army after 711 AD, very nearly extinguished modern White Europe—certainly the threat was no less serious than the Hunnish invasion which had earlier created so much chaos. While the Huns were Asiatics, the Moors were a mixed race invasion—part Arabic, part Black and part mixed race, always easily distinguishable from the Visigothic Whites of Spain.

To give a flavor of the content of this chapter I will add some subtitles to the images that Kemp chose for this specific chapter—omitting the images:

• Above: A dramatic painting—based on actual events—showing Moors celebrating the fall of a White Spanish town, with White females captured alive. For several years the Moors demanded—and received—a yearly tribute of young White girls for use in their harems after the great Moorish victory of 711. This yearly tribute continued until 791 AD when the Whites had recovered their strength enough to break the terms of a treaty with the non-Whites.

• Above: Captured White prisoners about to be decapitated by Saracens: note how the Spaniards are depicted with blond hair.

• Above: The non-White Moorish advance into Europe seemed unstoppable when in 732 AD they launched a massive invasion of present day France. The king of the leading White tribe in that country, Charles Martel of the Franks (who had their headquarters in present day Paris) mobilized a counter attack. A great race battle took place between the towns of Tours and Poitiers in central France in October 732 AD. The battle was one of the most momentous in the history of the White race. Defeat would have meant that all of Western Europe might have fallen under the sway of Islam, and the mixed races from the East would have poured into continental Europe. Accounts have it that 375,000 Moors were killed—the White army was utterly victorious over the non-White army and the Moorish invasion of Europe was halted in its tracks. Charles Martel earned his name—Martel means “hammer”—at this battle—he personally bludgeoned to death a large number of non-Whites with his favorite weapon, a mighty hammer.



The fourth great race war – Bulgars, Avars, Magyars and Khazars

The lands making up western and southern Russia, Asia Minor (Turkey) and the southeastern Balkans were to be the scene of some of the most dramatic racial conflicts between various tribes of Europeans on the one hand, and various Asiatic, Mongol, and mixed race Muslim armies on the other.

These wars started around 550 AD, a century after the crushing of the Mongolian Hunnish invasion of Europe. They only finally stopped with the defeat of new Asian invaders some 400 years later, with the defeat of an Asiatic alliance known as the Magyars, in Bavaria in 954 AD.

This massive struggle against Asian and Mongolian hordes can rightly be grouped into one heading, even though different players acted in the drama.

If these combined Asian invaders had not been turned back, then it would most certainly have given the non-White Moorish invasion in Spain, which took place in the same time span, a far better chance of success. The White race might have been exterminated between the Asians and the Moors—but it was not.



The fifth great race war – Genghis Khan

Genghis Khan’s first raid was into Russia in 1221, when his army smashed their way through several southern Russian principalities who were taken completely unawares by the yellow-skinned Mongolians.

Soon a huge part of southern Russia was under the sway of Genghis Khan—and not even the efforts of the Russian tribes to the north could dislodge him.

The invasion of southern Russian was in fact the only invasion of White held lands in which Genghis himself took part. He died suddenly in 1227, and the Mongolian armies paused for several years in southern Russia while a successor to Genghis was chosen from amongst the leading Mongolian chieftains.

In the interim the Mongols instituted a grim reign of terror over the White tribes they had subjugated. Whole settlements were slaughtered en masse, with lucky survivors barely escaping to the north and west, bringing tales of terror from the new Asiatic invaders.

One tactic for which the Mongols became famous was to sack a town, leave and then a few days later send a rearguard party back to the sacked town to see if any survivors had made their way back—any such unfortunates were put to death on the spot. In this way entire regions were quite literally stripped of all living souls.

Finally in 1236, the Mongol armies moved again, striking westwards in such numbers and ferocity that they reached deep into the Balkans, Hungary, northern Russia, Poland and central Germany.

Under the leadership of one Batu, a grandson of Genghis Khan, the Asiatics resumed their westward invasions in 1237, sacking the Russian city of Kiev in 1240, continuing westward into Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, and the Danube River valley.


Whites defeated at battle of Leignitz

An alliance of Germans, Poles and Teutons under the command of Duke Henry II of Silesia formed a united White army and desperately tried to stem the Asiatic advance. They met the Mongols in battle at Leignitz in what was then Poland in April 1241, but were badly defeated. Henry was beheaded by the Mongolians and for several days afterwards his impaled head was carried around on a spear at the head of the Mongol army until it rotted away.

The southern Indo-European tribes, the Slavs, then put together a new White army and launched an attack on the main body of the Mongol army in southern Europe. The battle, fought just north of Budapest, at the Sajo River in April 1241, saw the White armies defeated once again. The combined defeats inflicted upon the Russians, Germans and Slavs meant that all of Europe lay open to the Mongols.

In 1242, the Mongol hordes penetrated into the suburbs of Vienna itself—at that critical moment the non-White invasion ceased of its own accord.

It was a quirk of destiny which saved Europe and its peoples from complete extermination at the hands of the Mongols. In December 1241, the Asiatic army had just started on their final drive westwards, marching across the frozen Danube River, when a messenger arrived from their homeland in Mongolia—the successor to Genghis Khan had died. Then and there, the Mongol army turned around and withdrew back to the east. Leaderless, they were never to penetrate into central Europe again.

Even though the Mongols withdrew from central Europe, all of eastern and southern Russia remained under Mongol occupation, where Batu created what became known as the Khanate of the Golden Horde—the name originating from an annual tribute of riches extracted from the northern Russians, who only escaped occupation by formally acknowledging themselves as vassals by paying a yearly tribute to the Mongol rulers in the south.

The only eastern European state which was not humiliated in this way was Baltic Lithuania. As Mongol strength slowly declined, the Lithuanians expanded, eventually occupying an area stretching from the Baltic right to the Black Sea in the south. Lithuania in fact became the most powerful state in eastern Europe.

By the early 1300s, the Mongol Empire in the south had been wracked by internal divisions, with rival claimants to the Mongol throne launching a series of fratricidal wars amongst themselves. Seizing advantage of the confusion in the Asiatic ranks, the Grand Duke Dimitry of Moscow led an army against a huge Mongol force at Kukikovo, on the banks of the Don River, in 1330. Although great casualties were suffered by both sides, the White Russians won: the first major reverse suffered by the Mongols since their occupation of southern Russia.


Ivan the Great

The Mongols were then further weakened by renewed internal dissension, with a new Mongol warlord, Tamerlane, conquering much of the original Mongol Empire in Russia in 1395. After Tamerlane’s death, his empire was broken into four independent khanates: Astrakhan, Kazan, Crimea, and Sibir.

So divided, the Mongols were at last weakened to the point where the Muscovite principality, under the leadership of Ivan III, took the opportunity in 1480, to refuse to pay the annual tribute to the Horde.

Ivan, called The Great, who ruled from 1440 to 1505, then followed up the refusal to pay the tribute with a series of localized wars which expanded the borders of his kingdom—some were against other White principalities while some were against local Mongol chieftains. In this way a succession of slow moves south, combined with a process of assimilation, saw the last of the Mongol states vanish another century later, although the names they gave to these regions still persist.

The first major White reconquest of the southern parts of Russia only began in the mid 1500s, when bands of Russian peasants, known as Cossacks, fleeing the autocratic fiefdoms of northern Russia, started settling along the banks of the Don River basin.

The Cossacks engaged in a large clearing operation lasting many decades against the Mongols. By the mid-1600s the majority of Mongols had been cleared from central southern Russia—the remaining minority were for the greatest part absorbed into the new population.


The Mongol legacy

In central Europe, the Mongols were not physically present long enough to have a lasting genetic impact upon the local population, although unquestionably a small amount of Mongolian genes did enter the bloodstream of a tiny part of the population. This took place mainly through the wholesale rape of White women for which the Mongols were also famous. The major impact of the Mongol invasion upon southern and central Europe was that they physically killed huge numbers of Whites in their path, numbers which were lost forever.

In southern Russia however, the after-effects of three hundred years of Mongol rule left a clear genetic imprint upon many of the peoples in that region. Many of the peoples of regions such as Kazakhstan are of clear mixed racial origin. It is these people who are today often mistakenly called Slavs. Even though they were originally the easternmost Indo-European peoples and as such part of the Slavic tribes, their racial identify was completely submerged by the Mongol invasion and it would be genetically incorrect to classify them as Slavic.


The sixth great race war – the Ottoman Holocaust

The Ottoman Empire was the longest lasting non-White invasion of European soil ever. Lasting from the beginning of the 13th Century right to the start of the 20th, this group of mixed race Middle Eastern Turks, driven by a fanaticism molded in their Muslim religion, occupied vast stretches of central and southern Europe, twice being turned back at the very gates of Vienna in their attempts to seize all of Europe.

The impact and legacy of the Ottomans upon central and southern Europe was therefore vast, and crucial to any understanding of the racial and cultural mix which has made south-eastern Europe the volatile place that it is.

After describing the rise of the Ottomans and their first landings and battles on European soil in the 14th and 15th centuries, including how white resistance failed in the battles of Nicopolis and Varna, Kemp writes about the Janissaries, or “stolen white children” who became the Ottoman elite:

One of the more remarkable ways in which the Ottomans kept their fighting strength up was through a unit of soldiers known as the Janissaries. The Janissaries were the Ottoman’s elite forces—and they were also White.

One of the Ottoman leaders, Emir Orkhan (1326-1359), who was the first to occupy European continental soil, issued an edict to the conquered Europeans in the Balkans that they must hand over to the Ottomans 1,000 White male babies “with faces white and shining” each and every year. The youths were brought before the Ottoman sultan, and the best of them—in terms of physique, intelligence, and other qualities—were selected for education in the palace school. There they converted to Islam, became versed in the Islamic religion and its culture, learned Ottoman Turkish, Persian, and Arabic, and were compelled to serve the Ottomans, with their origins being concealed from them. They became the best and most trusted armed unit within the Ottoman Empire—a supreme act of irony.

This yearly tribute—reminiscent of the demand by the Moors for White virgins from the unfortunate Goths in Spain—was continued for an astonishing 300 years until 1648, during which time not only were 300,000 Whites absorbed into the Ottoman hierarchy (and for the greatest part also into the Turkish elite’s bloodstream) but the Janissaries became known as one of the most efficient army of soldiers in the world.

It is no exaggeration to say that they sustained the Ottoman Empire in Europe for much of its existence, playing a not inconsiderable role in many of the great victories of that Empire.

In 1574, the Janissaries had 20,000 men in their ranks—by 1826 the unit numbered some 135,000. The overtly racial make-up of the Janissaries always created problems of its own. Every now and then, the White soldiers would rebel against their Turkish masters—numerous rebellions are recorded, each being suppressed, until a famous rebellion in 1826 saw the unit finally disbanded, with a large number being killed and the rest dispersed into the broader Turkish population.

Kemp proceeds to explain how Jews were privileged under Turkish Rule; the fall of Constantinople; the war at sea when the Portuguese confronted the Turks; how Belgrade was captured in 1521 AD; the two sieges of Vienna; the Ottoman war with Russia, and finally the brutal destruction of Armenia in 1915-1923:

The region of Armenia, situated on the southeastern banks of the Black Sea, contains one of the most tragic and violent anti-White acts ever committed by the Ottoman Empire. Originally one of the earliest Indo-European homelands, Armenia has some of the oldest iron and bronze smelting and cereal grains sites in the world. Shaken by the flooding of the Black Sea basin around 5600 BC, Armenia was then occupied in quick succession by the early Indo-European Assyrians and Persians.

A period of independence followed, and under their great King Tigranes I (140-55 BC), Armenia established an empire which reached from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and parts of modern-day Syria. This empire ended with the invasion of that country by the Romans in 69 BC. Armenia then became the first Christian state in the world in AD 301.

Racially speaking, the inhabitants of the region had suffered slight genetic damage in terms of Semitic infusions, but the country was devastated by the 11th Century invasion by the Seljuk Turks, the forerunners of the Ottomans. The Seljuk Turks’ oppressive rule saw a huge number—possibly even a majority—of White Armenians fleeing the country.

The Ottoman Empire, which took over from the Seljuks, instituted an even greater reign of terror against the remaining Armenians, causing further waves of emigration right until the late 19th Century, with many Armenians settling in America.

Those who stayed in Armenia were subject to the most horrendous massacres and persecution, with hundreds of thousands of Armenians being massacred by Turkish forces, culminating in efforts by the Turkish government to move Armenians to Mesopotamia. Between 1915 and 1923 more than one million Armenians died due to the Turkish attempted forced migration.

armenians
The remains of Armenians massacred at Erzinjan

By this stage, the vast majority of White Armenians had either emigrated, or had been absorbed into the overwhelming numbers of non-Whites in the Armenia itself, so that today very few original White Armenians remain in the country.

Armenia was therefore a entire country and people who were physically wiped out by the Ottomans, one of the greatest hidden genocides of the Turkish Empire.


The Ottoman legacy

The Ottoman Turks were the last of the Asian invaders of Europe to use violence as their passport of entry, but they were also significant for another reason: the sheer length of the time of their occupation of the Balkans left a large number of the inhabitants of the Balkan peoples with Turkish blood in their veins, as can be seen to this day, as many inhabitants of the region are not only Muslim in faith, but are also distinctly darker than other Balkan residents.

All of these racial wars when whites faced extermination are a fascinating read.

Although the racial wars recounted by Kemp don’t end there, I won’t quote more to invite readers to purchase a hard copy of March of the Titans, an updated 2011 edition of the old online edition I’ve been quoting here (recently removed from the internet).

The fact is that unlike other races whites as a people have been an endangered species more than once, and this has paramount importance to understand our times. Personally, I find it outrageous that so few “white nationalists” are truly interested in the history of the white race; proof of it is that books like this are no bestsellers in the community.


Note:

For excerpts of all chapters of Kemp’s book see: here.

Book review by Tom Goodrich

Orderly & Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans After the Second World War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 2012). This review originally appeared at Counter-Currents.



orderlyandhumane
After reading a book or two and watching a few hours of TV documentaries on the couch, most smugly imagine that they know something of World War II. Most, of course, know nothing. What most think about WWII is what the winners want them to think about WWII; we call it the victor’s version of history. That version is a rather neat and tidy account, a clean and pleasing morality play of heroes and villains, of good versus evil, of catchy and easy to remember phrases like “Crusade in Europe,” the “Good War,” the “Greatest Generation,” “Nazi butchers,” “Hitler, the Evil Madman,” “Six Million,” etc. That black and white version paints the losers as all-evil, all-vicious, all-enslaving, all-everything bad and it paints the winners as all-good, all-suffering, all-liberating, all-noble, all-virtuous. But then, I’m wasting time on things most of you already know.

World War Two was man’s greatest cataclysm. Nothing else comes close. Tens of millions died, tens of millions were raped, tens of millions were enslaved, tens of millions were uprooted and cast to the wind, and the thing that Western man loves more than life itself—his freedom—was taken. With the fall of Germany and its allies in the spring of 1945, the forces of darkness stood gloating and triumphant. The last significant opposition to their grand designs on the West had been crushed, and now they went to work dividing the spoils and sucking the last drop of blood from the vanquished. One might imagine that from such an earth-shaking, epochal event every facet would have by now been studied down to the last detail by the world’s historians and academics, but one would imagine wrong. Precisely because the war was won by the forces of hate and evil, only one half of the story has ever been told and that, of course, is the side the winners chose to tell us.

Slowly, slowly, after nearly 70 years, the details from what it looked like down there in the grave where the losers lay are beginning to surface. And what is being revealed is a crime so monstrous, so enormous, and so hideous in its length and breadth that words have not yet been invented to describe it. So vicious and persistent was the anti-German propaganda, and so deep and pervasive was the consequent hatred for everything German both during and after the war, that this nearly successful attempt to extirpate the German people was committed with hardly a stir from the “civilized world.” So utterly demonized were the Germans by the largely Jewish press around the world that virtually anything could be said about Germany, virtually any crime could be committed against its helpless population, and none would raise a hand or offer a word against it. The evidence of crimes committed and the criminals who committed them have always been there. The horrifying accounts have remained in various archives and journals gathering nearly 70 years of dust but except for an intrepid few no historians have mustered the courage to reveal these dark secrets to the world.

In addition to deliberate attempts to kill every man, woman, and child in Germany by the Allied air forces with their terror bombing and “targets of opportunity” campaign (red crosses on hospital roofs were especial targets), a similar slaughter was taking place below as the invading hordes of the Soviet Union raped and/or murdered virtually every German that fell into their hands. On the Baltic Sea, a similar slaughter was taking place as Allied submarines and bombers sank every refugee ship they could find, killing tens of thousands of helpless women, children, the sick, and the elderly.

After the war, when the so-called peace was declared, millions of German POWs were herded into muddy outdoor fields where they remained without food, water, shelter, or medical treatment. Although there was plenty of food available, and although rivers often ran just beyond the barbed wire, Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight. D. Eisenhower, was determined to kill as many of the defeated as he could before world reaction stepped in to stop the slaughter.

“God, I hate the German,” hissed the future American president.

In other parts of defeated Germany, hell on earth was unleashed when Jewish émigrés and those released from concentration camps, with Allied bayonets to back them, rounded up German soldiers and civilians, men and women, then placed them in their own Jewish-run death camps. In addition to suffering some of the most sadistic and sickening tortures the mind can conjure, hundreds of thousands of these Germans were simply beaten to death, drowned, or buried alive.

One of the most heartless and deadly crimes committed against helpless Germans was the forced removal from their homes. Orderly and Humane—The Expulsion of the Germans After the Second World War by R. M. Douglas seeks to shed light on this little known aspect of World War II history. The story is a tragic one. First, some seven million Germans living in the eastern provinces of the Reich–Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia–were violently uprooted by land-hungry and vengeful Poles and ordered to leave, sometimes with only a few minutes’ notice. Then, several million more, many whose families had lived for centuries in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other central European nations were expelled by their envious and blood-thirsty neighbors. It is estimated that of the 12 to 14 million Germans cast to the wind, as many as two million perished. Many were slaughtered in hideous ways; others succumbed to the elements. In spite of Allied assurances to the world that the removal of these pathetic refugees was carried out in an “orderly and humane” manner, their lies were soon shown to be mere Orwellian double-speak.

I wanted to like this book. I wanted to welcome Professor Douglas into the world of truth-seekers. I wanted to praise both his bravery and honesty as well as his careful scholarship. But after only a short spin through the book, I discovered that I could not. From the outset, Douglas–a card-carrying court historian–wants to make it perfectly clear to his academic peers and the Jewish media watchdogs who stand in his career path with suspicious eyes and folded arms, that he has the “right stuff”; that this project is merely a scholarly study to understand post-war politics and European population dynamics and not an attempt to enlist sympathy for the Germans themselves; for the thousands of brained German babies, for the tens of thousands of murdered German men, for the hundreds of thousands of raped German women. “It is appropriate at the outset,” sniffs Douglas in his intro,

“to state explicitly that no legitimate comparison can be drawn between the postwar expulsions and the appalling record of German offenses against Jews and other innocent victims between 1939 and 1945. The extent of Nazi criminality and barbarity in central and eastern Europe is on a scale and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate. In the entire span of human history, nothing can be found to surpass it, nor… to equal it. Germany’s neighbors suffered most grievously and unjustifiably at her hands, and were profoundly traumatized as a result. Whatever occurred after the war cannot possibly be equated to the atrocities perpetrated by Germans during it, and suggestions to the contrary—including those made by expellees themselves—are both deeply offensive and historically illiterate. Nothing I have written in the book should be taken to suggest otherwise.”

With that nifty bit of genuflecting, with his kosher credentials seemingly intact, Douglas no doubt imagines that he will hence be given a life-long pass to enter the happy halls of historians. As this groveling academic will find out soon enough, a Christian writing about “controversial” Christian subjects will never crawl fast enough or far enough to satisfy his commissars.

In fairness to Douglas, he does go where few have gone before. The expulsion of Germans from the ancestral homes, many families of whom had lived there hundreds of years, is a crime so enormous and cruel that had it been the only crime committed by the Allies it would have been more than enough to convict them for all times to come as war criminals and inhuman monsters. Unfortunately, this Douglas tome is dry and dead as dust.

The German victims themselves are almost never heard from. Perhaps it is because Douglas feels Germans are not to be trusted. Citing that high moral authority, Edvard Beneš, the bloody butcher who orchestrated the massacre of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, Douglas quotes: “All German stories should not, of course, be believed, for Germans always exaggerated and were the first to whine and to try to enlist outside sympathy.” As a consequence, Douglas thereupon announces that he has thus “made it a rule to exclude direct expellee testimony that is not supported by independent sources.”

One must wonder just who these “independent sources” are that could provide better testimony than the victims themselves, but then again, perhaps that is not too hard to figure out. One must also wonder if Douglas would demand “independent sources” to support the statements of Jewish “survivors” and their extravagant claims of bestial Nazi atrocities? Of human soap? Of human lamp shades? Of shower heads spewing clouds of gas? Would he say those statements were also deeply offensive and historically illiterate? Right! And that is what separates this hypocritical court historian from an honest, unbiased truth-seeker.

Although a capable, competent study, as modern histories go, so intent is Douglas to dwell in the details of politics, borders, statistics, and demographics, that the personal and human is totally lost. One hardly is aware that the subjects of his book were actually real people, people who lived, breathed, suffered, cried, and all too often, people who died.

Nowhere is heard the screams of disarmed German soldiers as they were doused in gas by mobs and hung upside down like living torches. Nowhere is found the pathos of a mother, without shelter or food, watching her tiny child die of starvation right before her eyes. Nowhere are heard the groans of women, “from 8 to 80,” forced to endure one rape after another as they slowly bled to death.

This trend in modern historical writing—“historiography,” as it is stuffily called—is one reason why the reading of history has fallen in disrepute and why such books similar to Douglas’ cannot even be given away to the public. It is also why promising students upon entering college major in anything but history. This is the type of lifeless, insipid writing that kills the heat in a history-loving heart. I suppose it is easier for a reader to dismiss several million dead Germans if they fall asleep reading the book rather than transforming them into very real people who were deliberately murdered in cold blood.

What happened to Germany during and after the war was actually a crime wrapped around a crime—the evil abomination that was committed against the German people was the initial crime and the crime that kept it dark and hidden for almost 70 years was the other. If for no other reason, Orderly and Humane is important simply because of its existence and the tacit admission, tedious as it is, that once upon a time during the “Good War” this terrible crime did indeed occur.


___________________________

Thomas Goodrich is a professional writer living in Florida. Tom’s most recent book, Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany, has been excerpted here: the first comprehensive account of Allied war crimes committed against Germany and her allies.

Unending Struggle Between European and Asian

Excerpted from the 20th article of William Pierce’s “Who We Are: a Series of Articles on the History of the White Race”:


Today the geographical boundary between Europe and Africa-Asia runs roughly from the Strait of Gibraltar eastward across the Mediterranean to the Aegean Sea, along the eastern and northern shores of the Black Sea, thence along the spine of the Caucasus range to the Caspian Sea, and northward along the Urals to the Arctic Ocean. Somewhat more roughly a racial boundary follows the same course, dividing Whites to the north and west from non-Whites to the south and east.

Throughout history the borderlands on either side of this boundary have been contested between White and non-White, between European and Asian, and the contest has been fiercer, bloodier, crueler, and more unrelenting than any of the wars Europeans have fought among themselves. This is as it should be, considering the vastly greater stakes: when European fought European, the outcome determined which sovereign taxes would be paid to or the language one’s descendants would speak, but when European fought Asian the issue was whether or not one’s descendants would be White.

Race Pollution

Europe managed to stem the Brown tide in each case, but only at enormous cost. Huge areas of Europe were overrun by the Huns and their successors: Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, Magyars, Patzinaks, Cumans, Mongols, and Ottomans. Sometimes it was more than a century before the invaders could be expelled, and a great deal of racial mixing took place meanwhile.

Some European territory was lost permanently. Even today a large section of the ancient Indo-European homeland on the western shore of the Caspian Sea remains racially Mongoloid, while pockets of racially mixed population can be found throughout Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

End of the Golden Age

For more than a century the Scandinavian Goths mixed with the Alans and Slavs over whom they ruled. Then came the Huns. Slavs, Goths, and Alans all suffered mightily, and we have dealt with the ensuing events in an earlier installment. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the Hun invasion was the disaster which befell the Alans. The godlike race of Odin and Frigg, of Thor and Balder, met its Ragnarok.

Bulgars and Avars

Soon after the Germans crushed the Hun empire in 454, the surviving Huns retreated eastward, eventually regrouping around the Sea of Azov. There they acquired a new name: Bulgars.

Then, in the middle of the sixth century, even before Europe had recovered from the desolation left by the Huns, the next Brown wave struck. Driven westward by intertribal warfare in Central Asia, an amalgamation of Mongol tribes known to Europeans as the Avars invaded the Russian steppe in 560. Conquering the Slavs as they went, they were only halted when they came up against the Franks on the Elbe, in 562.

The Avars virtually annihilated the Gepids, to which nation the noble Ardaric, vanquisher of the Huns, had belonged, and seized the Gepids’ territory in Pannonia (modern Hungary), thenceforth centering the Avar empire there. The Avar strength peaked before 600 and declined quite rapidly thereafter, except in Pannonia.

Green-eyed Mongol

Some of the Asian invaders traveled quite rapidly through the peoples between their own homelands and Europe, absorbing little if any White blood on the way, while others took centuries to make the passage. Even those who did not linger among White or part-White populations often had absorbed some White genes as a result of the slave trade. From the fourth century through the 15th century there was an enormous traffic in White slaves, with millions of Slavs trudging eastward in slave caravans.

Thus, while the Mongols who struck in the 13th century passed like lightning from Mongolia to the eastern border of Europe, their chieftain, Genghis Khan, was described by contemporaries as having green eyes and reddish hair—undoubtedly a consequence of the slave trade. Some Turkish leaders were described as almost White in appearance.

Finally, we must remember that race treason is not a new phenomenon. Conquered Slav, Sarmatian, and German peoples sometimes became military auxiliaries of their Brown conquerors. When Attila was defeated by the Visigoths in 451 at Chalons, his horde consisted not only of Brown Huns but also of a number of White allies from the territories through which he had passed.

The Janissaries

The most effective means which the Ottomans employed in their struggle against White Europe, and the most humiliating to their White adversaries, was their corps of Janissaries. The Janissaries were the Ottomans’ elite army and they were entirely White.

During the reign of Emir Orkhan (1326-1359), the Ottoman ruler who first seized European soil, an edict was issued commanding the Emir’s White subjects to deliver to him each year exactly 1,000 young, male children. These children, who were required to have faces “white and shining,” were torn from their mothers’ breasts and then raised by the Turks with special care and rigor, trained in arms from a tender age and conditioned to give absolute obedience to their masters. Their military discipline was especially severe, but they were liberally rewarded for courage and proficiency.

Turkish Retreat

The yearly levy of 1,000 White children was continued for 300 years, until 1648, and during that period the Janissaries came to be the most efficient and feared corps of warriors in the world. They sustained the Turkish power in Central Europe, while the Mongol power in Eastern Europe withered.

Bastardized Balkans

The Ottoman Turks were the last of the Asian invaders of Europe, but they were certainly not the least. Their occupation has left as severe a racial imprint on the Balkan peoples—Yugoslavs, Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Rumanians—as the Mongol occupation did on the Russians.

Nevertheless, there remain today many groups throughout the Balkans which are as White as any group in Western Europe: some are immigrants from the north during recent centuries, while others are the descendants of clans and tribes which jealously guarded the purity of their blood and were able to avoid substantial racial mixture even during the darkest days of Asian occupation.

Whites under Attila the Hun

Excerpted from the 17th article of William Pierce’s “Who We Are: a Series of Articles on the History of the White Race”:


The Huns halted their westward push for more than 40 years while they consolidated their hold on all of central and eastern Europe, and on much of northern Europe as well. In 433 they gained a new king, whose name was Attila. In 445, when Attila established his new capital at Buda, in what is now Hungary, the empire of the Huns stretched from the Caspian Sea to the North Sea.

In 451 Attila began moving west again, with the intention of seizing Gaul and then the rest of the Western Empire. His army consisted not only of Huns but also of contingents from all the conquered peoples of Europe: Ostrogoths, Gepids, Rugians, Scirians, Heruls, Thuringians, and others, including Slavs.

One contingent was made up of Burgundians, half of whom the Huns had subjugated (and nearly annihilated) in 436. The struggle between the Burgundians and the Huns forms the background for the German heroic epic, the Nibelungenlied.

Scourge of God

Attila’s mixed army threw western Europe into a state of terror as it advanced. So great was the devastation wrought on the countryside that Attila was given the nickname “the Scourge of God,” and it was said that grass never again grew where his horse had trod.

Two armies, one commanded by Aëtius, the last of the Western Empire’s Roman generals, and the other by Theodoric, King of the Visigoths, rode against Attila. Aëtius and Theodoric united their armies south of the Loire, in central Gaul, and compelled Attila to withdraw to the north-east.

Attila carefully chose the spot to halt his horde and make his stand. It was in a vast, open, and nearly level expanse of ground in northeastern France between the Marne and the Seine, where his cavalry would have ideal conditions for maneuvering. The region was known as the Catalaunian Plains, after the Catalauni, a Celtic people. The name of Chalons (ancient Catalaunum), is most often associated with the battle which took place on the Catalaunian Plains, although the actual site is much closer to the city of Troyes.

White Victory

In a furious, day-long battle frightful losses were inflicted on both sides, but the Visigoths, Franks, free Burgundians, and Alans of Aëtius and Theodoric had gained a decisive advantage over the Huns and their allies by nightfall. Attila retreated behind his wagons and in despair ordered a huge funeral pyre built for himself. He intended neither to be taken alive by his foes nor to have his corpse fall into their hands.

King Theodoric had fallen during the day’s fighting, and the command of the Visigothic army had passed to his son, Thorismund. The latter was eager to press his advantage and avenge his father’s death by annihilating the Hunnic horde.

Empire of Attila (orange) by 450 A.D.

The wily Roman Aëtius, however, putting the interests of his dying Empire first, persuaded Thorismund to allow Attila to withdraw his horde from Gaul. Aëtius was afraid that if Thorismund completely destroyed the power of the Huns, then the Visigoths would again be a menace to the Empire; he preferred that the Huns and the Visigoths keep one another in check.

Battle of the Nedao

Attila and his army ravaged the countryside again, as they made their way back to Hungary. The following year they invaded northern Italy and razed the city of Aquileia to the ground; those of its inhabitants who were not killed fled into the nearby marshes, later to found the city of Venice.

But in 453 Attila died. The 60-year-old Hun burst a blood vessel during his wedding-night exertions, following his marriage to a blonde German maiden, Hildico (called Kriernhild in the Nibelungenlied). The Huns had already been stripped of their aura of invincibility by Theodoric, and the death of their leader diminished them still further in the eyes of their German vassals.

The latter, under the leadership of Ardaric the Gepid, rose up in 454. At the battle of the Nedao River in that year it was strictly German against Hun, and the Germans won a total victory, completely destroying the power of the Huns in Europe.

Slavic Opportunity

The vanquished Huns fled eastward, settling finally around the shores of the Sea of Azov in a vastly diminished realm. They left behind them only their name, in Hungary. Unfortunately, they also left some of their genes in those parts of Europe they had overrun. But in 80 years they had turned Europe upside down. Entire regions were depopulated, and the old status quo had vanished.

This provided an opportunity for the Slavs to expand, and they took advantage of it, as mentioned earlier. Unfortunately for them—and for our entire race—the area into which the Slavs expanded corresponded largely to the area invaded repeatedly in later centuries by Asiatic hordes from the east, and the Slavic peoples suffered grievously. We will examine these Asiatic invasions in later installments.

A hostile elite

or

Why every decent person should become
an anti-Semite: First reason

Today I read “Stalin’s willing executioners: Jews as a hostile elite in the USSR” by Prof. Kevin MacDonald: a book-review of Yuri Slezkine’s The Jewish Century (Princeton University Press, 2004).

Since MacDonald’s magnificent review is 17,000 words, I decided to cut it by half. Endnotes can be read in the original article (no ellipsis added between unquoted paragraphs):


A persistent theme among critics of Jews—particularly those on the pre-World War II right—has been that the Bolshevik revolution was a Jewish revolution and that the Soviet Union was dominated by Jews. This theme appears in a wide range of writings, from Henry Ford’s International Jew, to published statements by a long list of British, French, and American political figures in the 1920s (Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, and David Lloyd George), and, in its most extreme form, by Adolf Hitler, who wrote:

Now begins the last great revolution. By wresting political power for himself, the Jew casts off the few remaining shreds of disguise he still wears. The democratic plebeian Jew turns into the blood Jew and the tyrant of peoples. In a few years he will try to exterminate the national pillars of intelligence and, by robbing the peoples of their natural spiritual leadership, will make them ripe for the slavish lot of a permanent subjugation. The most terrible example of this is Russia.

Jewish involvement in the Communist elite of the USSR can be seen as a variation on an ancient theme in Jewish culture rather than a new one sprung from the special circumstances of the Bolshevik Revolution. Rather than being the willing agents of exploitative non-Jewish elites who were clearly separated from both the Jews and the people they ruled, Jews became an entrenched part of an exploitative and oppressive elite in which group boundaries were blurred. This blurring of boundaries was aided by four processes, all covered by Slezkine: shedding overt Jewish identities in favor of a veneer of international socialism in which Jewish identity and ethnic networking were relatively invisible; seeking lower-profile positions in order to de-emphasize Jewish preeminence (e.g., Trotsky); adopting Slavic names; and engaging in a limited amount of intermarriage with non-Jewish elites. Indeed, the “plethora of Jewish wives” among non-Jewish leaders doubtless heightened the Jewish atmosphere of the top levels of the Soviet government.

When Jews won the economic competition in early modern Poland, the result was that the great majority of Poles were reduced to the status of agricultural laborers supervised by Jewish estate managers in an economy in which trade, manufacturing, and artisanry were in large part controlled by Jews.

Slezkine does note that the rise of the Jews in the USSR came at the expense of the Germans as a Mercurian minority in Russia prior to the Revolution.

Or rather, the Russian Germans were to Russia what the German Jews were to Germany—only much more so. So fundamental were the German Mercurians to Russia’s view of itself that both their existence and their complete and abrupt disappearance have been routinely taken for granted (pp. 113–114).

The difference between the Jews and the Germans was that the Jews had a longstanding visceral antipathy, out of past historical grievances, both real and imagined. Vladimir Purishkevich, accused the Jews of “irreconcilable hatred of Russia and everything Russian.”

In this respect, the Germans were far more like the Overseas Chinese, in that they became an elite without having an aggressively hostile attitude toward the people and culture they administered and dominated economically. Thus when Jews achieved power in Russia, it was as a hostile elite with a deep sense of historic grievance. As a result, they became willing executioners of both the people and cultures they came to rule, including the Germans.

After the Revolution, not only were the Germans replaced, but there was active suppression of any remnants of the older order and their descendants.

* * *

Slezkine sees the United States as a Jewish promised land precisely because it is not defined tribally and “has no state-bearing natives” (p. 369). But the recasting of the United States as a “proposition nation” was importantly influenced by the triumph of several Jewish intellectual and political movements more than it was a natural and inevitable culmination of American history. These movements collectively delegitimized cultural currents of the early twentieth century whereby many Americans thought of themselves as members of a very successful ethnic group.

For example, the immigration restrictionists of the 1920s unabashedly asserted the right of European-derived peoples to the land they had conquered and settled. Americans of northern European descent in the United States thought of themselves as part of a cultural and ethnic heritage extending backward in time to the founding of the country, and writers like Madison Grant (The Passing of the Great Race) and Lothrop Stoddard (The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy) had a large public following. At that time both academia and mainstream culture believed in the reality of race; that there were important differences between the races, including in intelligence and moral character; and that races naturally competed for land and other resources.

It is no stretch at all, however, to show that Jews have achieved a preeminent position in Europe and America, and Slezkine provides us with statistics of Jewish domination only dimly hinted at in the following examples from Europe in the late nineteenth century to the rise of National Socialism. Austria: All but one bank in fin de siècle Vienna was administered by Jews, and Jews constituted 70% of the stock exchange council; Hungary: between 50 and 90 percent of all industry was controlled by Jewish banking families, and 71% of the most wealthy taxpayers were Jews; Germany: Jews were overrepresented among the economic elite by a factor of 33. Similar massive overrepresentation was also to be found in educational attainment and among professionals (e.g., Jews constituted 62% of the lawyers in Vienna in 1900, 25% in Prussia in 1925, 34% in Poland, and 51% in Hungary). Indeed,

the universities, “free” professions, salons, coffeehouses, concert halls, and art galleries in Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest became so heavily Jewish that liberalism and Jewishness became almost indistinguishable (p. 63).

Slezkine documents the well-known fact that, as Moritz Goldstein famously noted in 1912, “We Jews administer the spiritual possessions of Germany.” However, he regards Jewish cultural dominance, not only in Germany but throughout Eastern Europe and Austria, as completely benign: “The secular Jews’ love of Goethe, Schiller, and the other Pushkins—as well as the various northern forests they represented—was sincere and tender” (p. 68).

But the Germans, from Wagner to von Treitschke to Chamberlain and Hitler, didn’t see it that way. For example, Heinrich von Treitschke, a prominent nineteenth-century German intellectual, complained of Heine’s “mocking German humiliation and disgrace following the Napoleonic wars” and Heine’s having “no sense of shame, loyalty, truthfulness, or reverence.” Nor does he mention von Treitschke’s comment that “what Jewish journalists write in mockery and satirical remarks against Christianity is downright revolting”; “about the shortcomings of the Germans [or] French, everybody could freely say the worst things; but if somebody dared to speak in just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness of the Jewish character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and religious persecutor by nearly all of the newspapers.”

The main weapons Jews used against national cultures were two quintessentially modern ideologies, Marxism and Freudianism, “both [of which] countered nationalism’s quaint tribalism with a modern (scientific) path to wholeness” (p. 80). Slezkine correctly views both of these as Jewish ideologies functioning as organized religions, with sacred texts promising deliverance from earthly travail. While most of his book recounts the emergence of a Jewish elite under the banner of Marxism in the Soviet Union, his comments on psychoanalysis bear mentioning. Psychoanalysis “moved to the United States to reinforce democratic citizenship with a much-needed new prop…. In America, where nationwide tribal metaphors could not rely on theories of biological descent, Freudianism came in very handy indeed” by erecting the “Explicitly Therapeutic State” (pp. 79–80).

[Chechar’s note: See, e.g., my own critique of the therapeutic state in Spanish: here]

The establishment of the Explicitly Therapeutic State was much aided by yet another Jewish intellectual movement, the Frankfurt School, which combined psychoanalysis and Marxism. The result was a culture of critique which fundamentally aimed not only at delegitimizing the older American culture, but even attempted to alter or obliterate human nature itself: “The statistical connection between ‘the Jewish question’ and the hope for a new species of mankind seems fairly strong” (p. 90).

And when people don’t cooperate in becoming a new species, there’s always murder. Slezkine describes Walter Benjamin, an icon of the Frankfurt School and darling of the current crop of postmodern intellectuals, “with glasses on his nose, autumn in his soul and vicarious murder in his heart” (p. 216), a comment that illustrates the fine line between murder and cultural criticism, especially when engaged in by ethnic outsiders. Indeed, on another occasion, Benjamin stated, “Hatred and [the] spirit of sacrifice… are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren.” Although Slezkine downplays this aspect of Jewish motivation, Jews’ lachrymose perceptions of their history—their images of enslaved ancestors—were potent motivators of the hatred unleashed by the upheavals of the twentieth century.

Slezkine is entirely correct that Marxism, psychoanalysis, and the Frankfurt School were fundamentally Jewish intellectual movements. However, he fails to provide anything like a detailed account of how these ideologies served specifically Jewish interests, most generally in combating anti-Semitism and subverting ethnic identification among Europeans. Indeed, a major premise of his treatment is that Jewish radicals were not Jews at all.

* * *

In both the Soviet Union and Poland, Communism was seen as opposing anti-Semitism. In marked contrast, during the 1930s the Polish government enacted policies which excluded Jews from public-sector employment, established quotas on Jewish representation in universities and the professions, and organized boycotts of Jewish businesses and artisans. Clearly, Jews perceived Communism as good for Jews, and indeed a major contribution of Slezkine’s book is to document that Communism was good for Jews: It was a movement that never threatened Jewish group continuity, and it held the promise of Jewish power and influence and the end of state-sponsored anti-Semitism. And when this group achieved power in Poland after World War II, they liquidated the Polish nationalist movement, outlawed anti-Semitism, and established Jewish cultural and economic institutions.

As Slezkine himself notes, Jews were the only group that was not criticized by the revolutionary movement (p. 157), even though most Russians, and especially the lower classes whose cause they were supposedly championing, had very negative attitudes toward Jews. When, in 1915, Maxim Gorky, a strong philosemite, published a survey of Russian attitudes toward Jews, the most common response was typified by the comment that “the congenital, cruel, and consistent egoism of the Jews is everywhere victorious over the good-natured, uncultured, trusting Russian peasant or merchant” (p. 159). There were concerns that all of Russia would pass into Jewish hands and that Russians would become slaves of the Jews.


BOLSHEVISM AS A JEWISH REVOLUTION

But if Jews dominated radical and revolutionary organizations, they were immeasurably aided by philosemites like Gorky who, in Albert Lindemann’s term, were “jewified non-Jews” — “a term, freed of its ugly connotations, [that] might be used to underline an often overlooked point: Even in Russia there were some non-Jews, whether Bolsheviks or not, who respected Jews, praised them abundantly, imitated them, cared about their welfare, and established intimate friendships or romantic liaisons with them.” (As noted above, many of the non-Jewish elite in the USSR had Jewish wives.) What united the Jews and philosemites was their hatred for what Lenin (who had a Jewish grandfather) called “the thick-skulled, boorish, inert, and bearishly savage Russian or Ukrainian peasant” — the same peasant Gorky described as “savage, somnolent, and glued to his pile of manure” (p. 163). It was attitudes like these that created the climate that justified the slaughter of many millions of peasants under the new regime. Philosemites continued to be common among the non-Jewish elite in the USSR, even in the 1950s, when Jews began to be targeted as Jews.

Gorky’s love for the Jews was boundless. Despite the important role of Jews among the Bolsheviks, most Jews were not Bolsheviks before the revolution. However, Jews were prominent among the Bolsheviks, and once the revolution was under way, the vast majority of Russian Jews became sympathizers and active participants. Jews were particularly visible in the cities and as leaders in the army and in the revolutionary councils and committees. For example, there were 23 Jews among the 62 Bolsheviks in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee elected at the Second Congress of Soviets in October, 1917. Jews were the leaders of the movement, and to a great extent they were its public face. Slezkine quotes historian Mikhail Beizer who notes, commenting on the situation in Leningrad, that “Jewish names were constantly popping up in newspapers. Jews spoke relatively more often than others at rallies, conferences, and meetings of all kinds.”

In general, Jews were deployed in supervisory positions rather than positions that placed them in physical danger. In a Politburo meeting of April 18, 1919, Trotsky urged that Jews be redeployed because there were relatively few Jews in frontline combat units, while Jews constituted a “vast percentage” of the Cheka at the front and in the Executive Committees at the front and at the rear. This pattern had caused “chauvinist agitation” in the Red Army (p. 187).

Jewish representation at the top levels of the Cheka and OGPU (the acronyms by which the secret police was known in different periods) has often been the focus of those stressing Jewish involvement in the revolution and its aftermath. Slezkine provides statistics on Jewish overrepresentation in these organizations, especially in supervisory roles, and agrees with Leonard Schapiro’s comment that “anyone who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Cheka stood a very good chance of finding himself confronted with and possibly shot by a Jewish investigator” (p. 177). During the 1930s the secret police, then known as the NKVD, “was one of the most Jewish of all Soviet institutions” (p. 254), with 42 of its 111 top officials being Jewish. At this time 12 of the 20 NKVD directorates were headed by ethnic Jews, including those in charge of state security, police, labor camps, and resettlement (i.e., deportation). The Gulag was headed by ethnic Jews from its beginning in 1930 until the end of 1938, a period that encompasses the worst excesses of the Great Terror. They were, in Slezkine’s words, “Stalin’s willing executioners” (p. 103).

The Bolsheviks continued to apologize for Jewish overrepresentation until the topic became taboo in the 1930s. And it was not until the late 1930s that there was a rise in visibility and assertiveness of “anti-Semites, ethnic nationalists, and advocates of proportional representation” (p. 188). By this time the worst of the slaughters in the Gulag, the purges, and the contrived famines had been completed.

The prominence of Jews in the Revolution and its aftermath was not lost on participants on both sides, including influential figures such as Winston Churchill, who wrote that the role of Jews in the revolution “is certainly a very great one; it probably outweighs all others.” Slezkine highlights similar comments in a book published in 1927 by V. V. Shulgin, a Russian nationalist, who experienced firsthand the murderous acts of the Bolsheviks in his native Kiev in 1919:

We do not like the fact that this whole terrible thing was done on the Russian back and that it has cost us unutterable losses. We do not like the fact that you, Jews, a relatively small group within the Russian population, participated in this vile deed out of all proportion to your numbers (p. 181; italics in original).

Slezkine does not disagree with this assessment, but argues that Jews were hardly the only revolutionaries (p. 180). This is certainly true, but does not affect my argument that Jewish involvement was a necessary condition, not merely a sufficient condition, for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath. Slezkine’s argument clearly supports the Jews-as-necessary-condition claim, especially because of his emphasis on the leadership role of Jews.

However, the claim that Jewish involvement was a necessary condition is itself an understatement because, as Shulgin noted, the effectiveness of Jewish revolutionaries was far out of proportion to the number of Jews. A claim that a group constituting a large proportion of the population was necessary to the success of a movement would be unexceptional. But the critical importance of Jews occurred even though Jews constituted less than 5% of the Russian population around the time of the Revolution, and they were much less represented in the major urban areas of Moscow and Leningrad prior to the Revolution because they were prevented from living there by the Pale of Settlement laws. Slezkine is correct that Jews were not the only revolutionaries, but his point only underscores the importance of philosemitism and other alliances Jews typically must make in Diaspora situations in order to advance their perceived interests.

In 1923, several Jewish intellectuals published a collection of essays admitting the “bitter sin” of Jewish complicity in the crimes of the Revolution. In the words of a contributor, I. L. Bikerman, “it goes without saying that not all Jews are Bolsheviks and not all Bolsheviks are Jews, but what is equally obvious is that disproportionate and immeasurably fervent Jewish participation in the torment of half-dead Russia by the Bolsheviks” (p. 183). Many of the commentators on Jewish Bolsheviks noted the “transformation” of Jews: In the words of another Jewish commentator, G. A. Landau, “cruelty, sadism, and violence had seemed alien to a nation so far removed from physical activity.” And another Jewish commentator, Ia. A Bromberg, noted that:

the formerly oppressed lover of liberty had turned into a tyrant of “unheard-of-despotic arbitrariness”… The convinced and unconditional opponent of the death penalty not just for political crimes but for the most heinous offenses, who could not, as it were, watch a chicken being killed, has been transformed outwardly into a leather-clad person with a revolver and, in fact, lost all human likeness (pp. 183–184).

This psychological “transformation” of Russian Jews was probably not all that surprising to the Russians themselves, given Gorky’s finding that Russians prior to the Revolution saw Jews as possessed of “cruel egoism” and that they were concerned about becoming slaves of the Jews. Gorky himself remained a philosemite to the end, despite the prominent Jewish role in the murder of approximately twenty million of his ethnic kin, but after the Revolution he commented that “the reason for the current anti-Semitism in Russia is the tactlessness of the Jewish Bolsheviks. The Jewish Bolsheviks, not all of them but some irresponsible boys, are taking part in the defiling of the holy sites of the Russian people. They have turned churches into movie theaters and reading rooms without considering the feelings of the Russian people.” However, Gorky did not blame the Jews for this: “The fact that the Bolsheviks sent the Jews, the helpless and irresponsible Jewish youths, to do these things, does smack of provocation, of course. But the Jews should have refrained” (p. 186).

Those who carried out the mass murder and dispossession of the Russian peasants saw themselves, at least in their public pronouncements, as doing what was necessary in pursuit of the greater good. This was the official view not only of the Soviet Union, where Jews formed a dominant elite, but also was the “more or less official view” among Jewish intellectuals in the United States (p. 215) and elsewhere.


THE THREE GREAT JEWISH MIGRATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Slezkine’s last and longest chapter describes the three great Jewish migrations of the twentieth century—to Israel, to America, and to the urban centers of the Soviet Union. Slezkine perceives all three through the lens of heroic Jewish self-perception. He sees the United States as a Jewish utopia precisely because it had only a “vestigial establishment tribalism” (p. 209) that could not long inhibit Jewish ascendancy:

The United States stood for unabashed Mercurianism, nontribal statehood, and the supreme sovereignty of capitalism and professionalism. It was—rhetorically—a collection of homines rationalistici artificiales, a nation of strangers held together by a common celebration of separateness (individualism) and rootlessness (immigration) (p. 207).

It was the only modern state “…in which a Jew could be an equal citizen and a Jew at the same time. ‘America’ offered full membership without complete assimilation. Indeed, it seemed to require an affiliation with a subnational community as a condition of full membership in the political nation” (p. 207). Slezkine sees post-World War II America as a Jewish utopia but seems only dimly aware that Jews to a great extent created their own utopia in the U.S. by undermining nativist sentiments that were common at least until after World War II. Slezkine emphasizes the Jewish role in institutionalizing the therapeutic state, but sees it as completely benign, rather than an aspect of the “culture of critique” that undermined the ethnic identities of white Americans: “By bringing Freudianism to America and by adopting it, briefly, as a salvation religion, [Jews] made themselves more American while making America more therapeutic” (p. 319). There is little discussion of the main anti-nativist intellectual movements, all of which were dominated by ethnically conscious Jews: Boasian anthropology, Horace Kallen and the development of the theory of America as a “proposition nation,” and the Frankfurt School which combined psychoanalysis and Marxism into a devastating weapon against the ethnic consciousness of white Americans. Nor does he discuss the role of Jewish activist organizations in altering the ethnic balance of the United States by promoting large-scale immigration from around the world.

But Slezkine spends most of his energy by far in providing a fascinating chronicle of the Jewish rise to elite status in all areas of Soviet society—culture, the universities, professional occupations, the media, and government. In all cases, Jewish overrepresentation was most apparent at the pinnacles of success and influence. To take just the area of culture, Jews were highly visible as avant-garde artists, formalist theorists, polemicists, moviemakers, and poets. They were “among the most exuberant crusaders against ‘bourgeois’ habits during the Great Transformation; the most disciplined advocates of socialist realism during the ‘Great Retreat’ (from revolutionary internationalism); and the most passionate prophets of faith, hope, and combat during the Great Patriotic War against the Nazis” (p. 225). And, as their critics noticed, Jews were involved in anti-Christian propaganda. Mikhail Bulgakov, a Russian writer, noticed that the publishers of Godless magazine were Jews; he was “stunned” to find that Christ was portrayed as “a scoundrel and a cheat. It is not hard to see whose work it is. This crime is immeasurable” (p. 244).

*  *  *

Some of the juxtapositions are striking and seemingly intentional. On p. 230, Lev Kopelev is quoted on the need for firmness in confiscating the property of the Ukrainian peasants. Kopelev, who witnessed the famine that killed seven to ten million peasants, stated, “You mustn’t give in to debilitating pity. We are the agents of historical necessity. We are fulfilling our revolutionary duty. We are procuring grain for our socialist Fatherland. For the Five-Year Plan.” On the next page, Slezkine describes the life of the largely Jewish elite in Moscow and Leningrad, where they attended the theater, sent their children to the best schools, had peasant women for nannies, spent weekends at pleasant dachas, and vacationed at the Black Sea.

Slezkine describes the NKVD as “one of the most Jewish of all Soviet institutions” and recounts the Jewish leadership of the Great Terror of the 1930s (pp. 254 and 255). On p. 256, he writes that in 1937 the prototypical Jew who moved from the Pale of Settlement to Moscow to man elite positions in the Soviet state “probably would have been living in elite housing in downtown Moscow…with access to special stores, a house in the country (dacha), and a live-in peasant nanny or maid…” (p. 256), but the reader is left to his own imagination to visualize the horrors of the Ukrainian famine and the liquidation of the Kulaks.

As Slezkine notes, most of the Soviet elite were not Jews, but Jews were far overrepresented among the elite (and Russians far underrepresented as a percentage of the population). Moreover, the Jews formed a far more cohesive core than the rest of the elite because of their common social and cultural background (p. 236). The common understanding that the new elite had a very large Jewish representation resulted in pervasive anti-Jewish attitudes. In 1926, an Agitprop report noted:

The sense that the Soviet regime patronizes the Jews, that it is ‘the Jewish government,’ that the Jews cause unemployment, housing shortages, college admissions problems, price rises, and commercial speculation—this sense is instilled in the workers by all the hostile elements… If it does not encounter resistance, the wave of anti-Semitism threatens to become, in the very near future, a serious political question (p. 244).

Such widespread public perceptions about the role of Jews in the new government led to aggressive surveillance and repression of anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior, including the execution of Russian nationalists who expressed anti-Jewish attitudes. These public perceptions also motivated Jews to adopt a lower profile in the regime, as with Trotsky, who refused the post of commissar of internal affairs because it might lend further ammunition to the anti-Jewish arguments. From 1927 to 1932 Stalin established an ambitious public campaign to combat anti-Semitism that included fifty-six books published by the government and an onslaught of speeches, mass rallies, newspaper articles, and show trials “aimed at eradicating the evil” (p. 249).


THE DECLINE OF THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Jews were able to maintain themselves as an elite until the end of the Soviet regime in 1991. On the whole, Jews were underrepresented as victims of the Great Terror. Jews also retained their elite status despite Stalin’s campaign in the late 1940s against Jewish ethnic and cultural institutions and their spokesmen.

Slezkine shows the very high percentages of Jews in various institutions in the late 1940s, including the universities, the media, the foreign service, and the secret police. The campaign against the Jews began only after the apogee of mass murder and deportations in the USSR.

Unlike the purges of the 1930s that sometimes targeted Jews as member of the elite (albeit at far less than their percentage of the elite), the anti-Jewish actions of the late 1940s and early 1950s were targeted at Jews because of their ethnicity. Similar purges were performed throughout Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe (pp. 313–314). “All three regimes [Poland, Romania, Hungary] resembled the Soviet Union of the 1920s insofar as they combined the ruling core of the old Communist underground, which was heavily Jewish, with a large pool of upwardly mobile Jewish professionals, who were, on average, the most trustworthy among the educated and the most educated among the trustworthy” (p. 314). Speaking of the situation in Poland, Khrushchev supported the anti-Jewish purge with his remark that “you have already too many Abramoviches.”

Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s children of the pillars of the old order were discriminated against, now Jews were not only being purged because of their vast overrepresentation among the elite, but were being discriminated against in university admissions. Jews, the formerly loyal members of the elite and willing executioners of the bloodiest regime in history, now “found themselves among the aliens” (p. 310).

And so began the exodus of Jews. Stalin died and the anti-Jewish campaign fizzled, but the Jewish trajectory was definitely downhill. Jews retained their elite status and occupational profile until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but “the special relationship between the Jews and the Soviet state had come to an end—or rather, the unique symbiosis in pursuit of world revolution had given way to a unique antagonism over two competing and incommensurate nationalisms” (p. 330). A response of the Russians was “massive affirmative action” (p. 333) aimed at giving greater representation to underrepresented ethnic groups. Jews were targets of suspicion because of their ethnic status, barred from some elite institutions, and limited in their opportunities for advancement.

The Russians were taking back their country, and it wasn’t long before Jews became leaders of the dissident movement and began to seek to emigrate in droves to the United States, Western Europe, and Israel.

Applications to leave the USSR increased dramatically after Israel’s Six-Day War of 1967, which, as in the United States and Eastern Europe, resulted in an upsurge of Jewish identification and ethnic pride. The floodgates were eventually opened by Gorbachev in the late 1980s, and by 1994, 1.2 million Soviet Jews had emigrated — 43% of the total. By 2002, there were only 230,000 Jews left in the Russian Federation, 0.16% of the population. These remaining Jews nevertheless exhibit the typical Ashkenazi pattern of high achievement and overrepresentation among the elite, including six of the seven oligarchs who emerged in control of the Soviet economy and media in the period of de-nationalization (p. 362).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this dénouement did not result in any sense of collective guilt among Soviet Jews (p. 345) or among their American apologists. Indeed, American Jewish media figures who were blacklisted because of Communist affiliations in the 1940s are now heroes, honored by the film industry, praised in newspapers, their work exhibited in museums.

At the same time, the cause of Soviet Jews and their ability to emigrate became a critical rallying point for American Jewish activist organizations and a defining feature of neoconservatism as a Jewish intellectual and political movement. (For example, Richard Perle, a key neoconservative, was Senator Henry Jackson’s most important security advisor from 1969 to 1979 and organized Congressional support for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking US-Soviet trade to the ability of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The bill was passed over strenuous opposition from the Nixon administration.) Jewish activist organizations and many Jewish historians portray the Soviet Jewish experience as a sojourn in the land of the “Red Pharaohs” (p. 360). The historical legacy is that Jews were the passive, uncomprehending victims of the White armies, the Nazis, the Ukrainian nationalists, and the postwar Soviet state, nothing more.


THE ISSUE OF JEWISH CULPABILITY

Alexander Solzhenitsyn calls on Jews to accept moral responsibility for the Jews who “took part in the iron Bolshevik leadership and, even more so, in the ideological guidance of a huge country down a false path… [and for the Jewish role in the] Cheka executions, the drowning of the barges with the condemned in the White and Caspian Seas, collectivization, the Ukrainian famine—in all the vile acts of the Soviet regime” (quoted on p. 360). But according to Slezkine, there can be no collective guilt.

There can be little doubt that Lenin’s contempt for “the thick-skulled, boorish, inert, and bearishly savage Russian or Ukrainian peasant” was shared by the vast majority of shtetl Jews prior to the Revolution and after it. Those Jews who defiled the holy places of traditional Russian culture and published anti-Christian periodicals doubtless reveled in their tasks for entirely Jewish reasons, and, as Gorky worried, their activities not unreasonably stoked the anti-Semitism of the period.

Given the anti-Christian attitudes of traditional shtetl Jews, it is very difficult to believe that the Jews engaged in campaigns against Christianity did not have a sense of revenge against the old culture that they held in such contempt. Indeed, Slezkine reviews some of the works of early Soviet Jewish writers that illustrate the revenge theme. The amorous advances of the Jewish protagonist of Eduard Bagritsky’s poem “February” are rebuffed by a Russian girl, but their positions are changed after the Revolution when he becomes a deputy commissar. Seeing the girl in a brothel, he has sex with her without taking off his boots, his gun, or his trench coat—an act of aggression and revenge:

I am taking you because so timid
Have I always been, and to take vengeance
For the shame of my exiled forefathers
And the twitter of an unknown fledgling!
I am taking you to wreak my vengeance
On the world I could not get away from!

Slezkine seems comfortable with revenge as a Jewish motive. [His] argument that Jews were critically involved in destroying traditional Russian institutions, liquidating Russian nationalists, murdering the tsar and his family, dispossessing and murdering the kulaks, and destroying the Orthodox Church has been made by many other writers over the years, including Igor Shafarevich, a mathematician and member of the prestigious U. S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Shafarevich’s review of Jewish literary works during the Soviet and post-Soviet period agrees with Slezkine in showing Jewish hatred mixed with a powerful desire for revenge toward pre-revolutionary Russia and its culture.

But Shafarevich also suggests that the Jewish “Russophobia” that prompted the mass murder is not a unique phenomenon, but results from traditional Jewish hostility toward the non-Jewish world, considered tref (unclean), and toward non-Jews themselves, considered subhuman and as worthy of destruction. Both Shafarevich and Slezkine review the traditional animosity of Jews toward Russia, but Slezkine attempts to get his readers to believe that shtetl Jews were magically transformed in the instant of Revolution; although they did carry out the destruction of traditional Russia and approximately twenty million of its people, they did so only out of the highest humanitarian motives and the dream of utopian socialism, only to return to an overt Jewish identity because of the pressures of World War II, the rise of Israel as a source of Jewish identity and pride, and anti-Jewish policies and attitudes in the USSR.

This is simply not plausible.

* * *

The situation prompts reflection on what might have happened in the United States had American Communists and their sympathizers assumed power. The “red diaper babies” came from Jewish families which “around the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the United States is.” Indeed, hatred toward the peoples and cultures of non-Jews and the image of enslaved ancestors as victims of anti-Semitism have been the Jewish norm throughout history—much commented on, from Tacitus to the present.

It is easy to imagine which sectors of American society would have been deemed overly backward and religious and therefore worthy of mass murder by the American counterparts of the Jewish elite in the Soviet Union—the ones who journeyed to Ellis Island instead of Moscow. The descendants of these overly backward and religious people now loom large among the “red state” voters who have been so important in recent national elections. Jewish animosity toward the Christian culture that is so deeply ingrained in much of America is legendary. As Joel Kotkin points out, “for generations, [American] Jews have viewed religious conservatives with a combination of fear and disdain.” And as Elliott Abrams notes, the American Jewish community “clings to what is at bottom a dark vision of America, as a land permeated with anti-Semitism and always on the verge of anti-Semitic outbursts.”

These attitudes are well captured in Steven Steinlight’s charge that the Americans who approved the immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s—the vast majority of the population—were a “thoughtless mob” and that the legislation itself was “evil, xenophobic, anti-Semitic,” “vilely discriminatory,” a “vast moral failure,” a “monstrous policy.” In the end, the dark view of traditional Slavs and their culture that facilitated the participation of so many Eastern European shtetl Jews in becoming willing executioners in the name of international socialism is not very different from the views of contemporary American Jews about a majority of their fellow countrymen.

There is a certain enormity in all this. The twentieth century was indeed the Jewish century because Jews and Jewish organizations were intimately and decisively involved in its most important events. Slezkine’s greatest accomplishment is to set the historical record straight on the importance of Jews in the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath, but he doesn’t focus on the huge repercussions of the Revolution, repercussions that continue to shape the world of the twenty-first century. In fact, for long after the Revolution, conservatives throughout Europe and the United States believed that Jews were responsible for Communism and for the Bolshevik Revolution. The Jewish role in leftist political movements was a common source of anti-Jewish attitudes among a great many intellectuals and political figures.

In Germany, the identification of Jews and Bolshevism was widespread in the middle classes and was a critical part of the National Socialist view of the world. As historian Ernst Nolte has noted, for middle-class Germans, “the experience of the Bolshevik revolution in Germany was so immediate, so close to home, and so disquieting, and statistics seemed to prove the overwhelming participation of Jewish ringleaders so irrefutably,” that even many liberals believed in Jewish responsibility.

Jewish involvement in the horrors of Communism was also an important sentiment in Hitler’s desire to destroy the USSR and in the anti-Jewish actions of the German National Socialist government. Jews and Jewish organizations were also important forces in inducing the Western democracies to side with Stalin rather than Hitler in World War II.

The victory over National Socialism set the stage for the tremendous increase in Jewish power in the post-World War II Western world, in the end more than compensating for the decline of Jews in the Soviet Union. As Slezkine shows, the children of Jewish immigrants assumed an elite position in the United States, just as they had in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe and Germany prior to World War II. This new-found power facilitated the establishment of Israel, the transformation of the United States and other Western nations in the direction of multiracial, multicultural societies via large-scale non-white immigration, and the consequent decline in European demographic and cultural preeminence. The critical Jewish role in Communism has been sanitized, while Jewish victimization by the Nazis has achieved the status of a moral touchstone and is a prime weapon in the push for massive non-European immigration, multiculturalism, and advancing other Jewish causes.

The Jewish involvement in Bolshevism has therefore had an enormous effect on recent European and American history. It is certainly true that Jews would have attained elite status in the United States with or without their prominence in the Soviet Union. However, without the Soviet Union as a shining beacon of a land freed of official anti-Semitism where Jews had attained elite status in a stunningly short period, the history of the United States would have been very different. The persistence of Jewish radicalism influenced the general political sensibility of the Jewish community and had a destabilizing effect on American society, ranging from the paranoia of the McCarthy era, to the triumph of the 1960s countercultural revolution, to the conflicts over immigration and multiculturalism that are so much a part of the contemporary political landscape.

It is Slezkine’s chief contention that the history of the twentieth century was a history of the rise of the Jews in the West, in the Middle East, and in Russia, and ultimately their decline in Russia. I think he is absolutely right about this. If there is any lesson to be learned, it is that Jews not only became an elite in all these areas, they became a hostile elite—hostile to traditional peoples and cultures of all three areas they came to dominate. Until now, the greatest human tragedies have occurred in the Soviet Union, but Israel’s record as an oppressive and expansive occupying power in the Middle East has made it a pariah among the vast majority of the governments of the world. And Jewish hostility toward the European-derived people and culture of the United States has been a consistent feature of Jewish political behavior and attitudes throughout the twentieth century. In the present, this normative Jewish hostility toward the traditional population and culture of the United States remains a potent motivator of Jewish involvement in the transformation of the U.S. into a non-European society.

Given this record of Jews as a hostile but very successful elite, I doubt that the continued demographic and cultural dominance of Western European peoples will be retained either in Europe or the United States and other Western societies without a decline in Jewish influence. The lesson of the Soviet Union (and Spain from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries) is that Jewish influence does wax and wane. Unlike the attitudes of the utopian ideologies of the twentieth century, there is no end to history.

___________

In another entry I will deal with the “second reason” why every decent person should become an anti-Semite: the Jewish role in shaping American immigration policies.

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