Michael O’Meara’s “Toward the White Republic”

by César Tort



My very short review of O’Meara’s book, that in Amazon I tagged as “Best pamphlet on White Nationalism ever,” appeared a year ago at Counter-Currents Publishing (slightly edited):

“Mightier than the tread of marching armies is the power of an idea whose time has come.”

—Victor Hugo

I have read Michael O’Meara’s recently published Toward the White Republic. It’s an honor for me to own copy #56 with O’Meara’s personal inscription to me on the very first page.

O’Meara is absolutely right: A numinous vision always comes before galvanizing the collective unconsciousness, and the mere idea of a white ethnostate does reminds us the Latin saying “Thus I will, thus I command.”

In the 16th century, the English believed they had replaced the Jews as the chosen nation: an important factor in American history which also helped Elizabethan England in their fight against Catholic Spain. O’Meara’s powerful book demonstrates that what moves societies is not scientific fact, e.g., IQ studies of blacks versus whites, but myths. Only myths can galvanize the collective unconsciousness of a nation. Homer’s epics captivated the minds of the ancient Greeks, not the geometric discoveries of the Ionian scientists and philosophers.

For John Winthrop, the previous American colonies had failed because they were carnal and irreligious. He believed that only an enterprise founded on religion had a chance to thrive.

Even if God doesn’t exist and Christianity is ultimately false, Winthrop was right. In 1630 he led an exodus of his people to the new world. It is beyond doubt that the spirit animating these men and women was not economic but religious. A “City upon a Hill” watched by the world was the myth that galvanized the community.

In sharp contrast to present-day Americans’ aid after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, once on American soil, Winthrop was delighted by the news that North American Indians were being decimated by smallpox. It was clear to the Puritans that God had accepted their right to occupy the land.

After the Reconquista generated the sense of a religious nation, something similar happened here down the South. The Catholic myth, catalyzed by the Counter-Reformation, moved the Spaniards to conquer the Aztec and Inca empires.

Winthrop’s success resolved a mystery for me. Why were the English so reluctant to establish themselves in America even a century after Columbus’ discovery while the relatively more primitive Spanish and the Portuguese had already created vast empires? The answer is patently clear: The English lacked a truly galvanizing story that conferred upon them a definite self-image and consequent self-esteem.

Something similar could be said of the Great Awakening in America’s 1730s. An awakening is what whites desperately need today, albeit one based upon a different kind of myth.

Toward the White Republic is more than a must read. Copies of this slim yet potent book could be given to your friends and acquaintances as part of the process of starting another Great Awakening.


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For my favorite essays in O’Meara’s book see here.

Without a myth there will be no revolution

The following article, “The Myth of Our Rebirth” is the second essay in Michael O’Meara’s book Toward the White Republic, available from Counter-Currents Publishing here.

My talk this evening is about what might be called “the power of myth.”

I refer here not to the Bill Moyers’ program of the same name, but rather to the politics of white racial preservation and specifically to what preservation entails at the deepest level of the human psyche, at that level of primordial symbolical activity, which is the realm of myth and epic poetry.

In approaching this subject, let me start with a few words about The Occidental Quarterly, for that’s where the subject begins.

The Quarterly’s project is not about myth per se, but about “metapolitics,” which, though it has a mythic dimension, deals mainly with rationally-examined ideas and values.

What is “metapolitics”?

This is a term you won’t find in the dictionary, and when it enters political discourse its meaning is often unclear.

I understand the term “metapolitics” mainly by analogy. Metapolitics is to politics as metaphysics is to physics.

What, then, is the relationship of metaphysics to physics?

According to my dictionary, physics is “the science of matter and energy and of the interaction between the two.”

“Metaphysics,” by contrast, is about that which is beyond physics—that is, it’s about the ultimate reality (assuming there is one) upon which the world of energy and matter rests.

Metaphysics, then, studies that which is the basis for the study of physics (whatever that may be).

Now if metapolitics is to politics as metaphysics is to physics, then metapolitics might be defined as that which addresses all those things that make politics possible.

Like the broad sense of metaphysics, metapolitics refers to a number of possible subjects. For example: It can refer to ideology, to culture, to the prevailing conceptual paradigms, to the social hegemonies shaping the political field and framing the way we approach them. It can even refer to the irrational and subliminal forces affecting public behavior.

I can’t give you a precise definition of “metapolitics” (I think none exists), but I can explain something of what metapolitics means to The Occidental Quarterly.

The Quarterly’s subtitle is: “Western Perspectives on Man, Culture, and Politics.”

“Western Perspectives” here means “white” or “European-American” perspectives on man, culture, and politics.

Accordingly, the Quarterly’s metapolitical project examines and entertains ideas of man, culture, and politics from the perspective of what they mean for white men—and by implication what they mean in terms of their fitness, suitability, and adaptability to the politics of white racial preservation.

This metapolitical project is important not simply because ideas, as our conservatives tell us, “have consequences.” But also because we live in an age of inversion, where all the traditional ideas, along with all the traditional values and beliefs, have been subverted and turned against whites.

The Quarterly’s metapolitical project, it follows, is about intellectually arming whites so that, at one level, horizontally, they can collectively resist the inverted forces threatening them as a people—and that, vertically, they can affirm and assert those ideas and values which are distinct to the European-American spirit.

Yet, despite all this and despite the fact that its metapolitical project addresses the most elemental aspects of our existence, the Quarterly’s focus on ideas, and sometimes high ideas, is of interest, alas, to but a few.

The “people” as a mass lack any interest in what they see as the unreal, impractical, and often inaccessible realm of ideas.

Whenever they enter the historical arena under the banner of the great social and nationalist movements, they are, for this reason, moved not by ideas, not even by self-interest, but by something else entirely—which has to do with (let’s call it) the mythic core of metapolitics.

Before getting to this, let me just quickly finish what I started to say about The Occidental Quarterly. The writers, activists, and sponsors who support its metapolitical project are not merely interested in understanding and interpreting the inverted world that seeks the destruction of their kind. They want also to change this world.

The Quarterly’s metapolitical project aims, thus, at putting in motion a movement—in thought, to start—that will lead to the eventual founding of a white ethnostate and, with it, a restoration of the white man’s rightful place in the world—and I don’t mean this in any Hollywood Nazi sense, but rather in terms of a people’s national right to retain the ownership and control of their own lands.

If history is any guide, the great transformative movements of the past depended on a variety of subjective and objective factors. Objectively, some sort of crisis of regime has usually been a precondition for setting an oppositional movement in motion; this could entail a crisis of legitimacy or a social or economic breakdown.

Such a crisis will not, however, culminate in a revolutionary transformation unless certain subjective forces—in the form of a revolutionary movement—are prepared to exploit the crisis for the movement’s sake. Generally, this entails that a movement possesses both a cadre (capable of leading the movement) and a mass following (that gives the movement’s leadership the social leverage to carry out a revolutionary transformation of the existing system).

The cadre are the active minorities, the militants and intellectuals, who possess the communication and bargaining skills to articulate and define the movement’s cause, who establish the organizations that represent their cause in the real world, and who lay the groundwork that—ideally—will eventually intersect the mobilized masses, whose leadership they aspire to win.

These active minorities are the movement’s brains and hands, for their cultural and organizational activities prepare the way for the movement’s history-changing role.

The Quarterly’s metapolitical project falls within the domain of such activity, which is why it has an important role to play in this period.

But if every great movement is articulated and organized by its active minorities, who constitute, in effect, a potential counter-elite, challenging the ruling elites, its success in the end depends less on the quality of their ideas or even the viability of their organization than on the masses who identify with their struggle and willingly make the sacrifices necessary to realize its goals.

Indeed, without significant mass support, no revolutionary movement has ever reached its end.

As one German nationalist put it: “The history of the world is made by [active] minorities only if they embody the will and aspirations of the majority.”

Given that the heroism and self-sacrifice of the masses have been pivotal to virtually every revolutionary transformation of the modern era—and that these same masses are moved not by ideas or self-interest—how, then, are they to be rallied to the cause of white racial preservation?

One of the great revolutionaries who started us thinking about this question is Georges Sorel, who, not coincidentally, had a major influence on the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the labor movement, as well as on the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the nationalist movement (and it’s worth mentioning that the historical synthesis of these two movements—of the revolutionary labor and nationalist movements—in the interwar period [1918–1939] led directly to the emergence of Fascism, National Socialism, and other anti-liberal Third Way tendencies representing the historical high-water mark of revolutionary nationalism).

The motive force behind mass movements, Sorel saw, cannot be explained, as liberals and Marxists do, in terms of rationalist, pragmatic, materialist, or self-interested factors—for the masses making up a social movement do not behave like liberalism’s Economic Man. Sorel, in fact, saw excessive rationalism as both a source and a symptom of contemporary decadence.

The bonds that tie men to reality and compel them to act are rarely based on cold reason or calculation. The human intellect, especially its rationalist mode, is simply part of a larger human consciousness—a consciousness synonymous not just with man’s reasoning mind, but more fundamentally with his life as a social, moral being rooted in families and the tribal affiliations that make his communities resilient. At this level, the consciousness motivating the collective behavior of mass movements is “irrational,” for it is dictated not by self-interest and calculation, but by more elemental passions.

Reason, self-interest, and other such factors may, of course, bring about reform and self-improvement and every modern social system depends on them, but these factors never propel men into battle at the risk of life and limb. They never cause a people to go beyond the bounds of reasonable considerations, to shun their narrow egoism, and take risks that challenge the prevailing state of things.

Something more primordial is always at work whenever the masses enter the historical arena.

For Sorel, a people assumes a historical role only when they are seized by an enthralling myth, whose symbols embody both their conscious and unconscious worldview and accord with their moral and ethical judgments about what’s fair or just. Myth, as such, forms communities of like-minded people and thus a sense of solidarity, just as the heroic sensibility it fosters makes possible the social and moral renewal that’s part of every revolutionary transformation.

“As long as there are no myths accepted by the masses,” Sorel writes, “one may go on talking of revolt indefinitely, without provoking any revolutionary movement.”

In Sorel’s view, myth is that “body of images which, by intuition alone,” is “capable of evoking… the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations” of a people’s distinct spirit, as this people struggles to assert itself as a specific life form. Myth thus translates a people’s hopes and needs into their own idiom and feeds these hopes and needs back to them in ways that render them plausible and attractive.

Myth, in this Sorelian sense, grows out of not just the struggle itself, but the unmediated life of those who come to believe it.

Born, thus, from a people’s sense of itself, myth creates not just a sense of mission, but the courage to act—as a self-conscious, self-asserting force of life.

In this way, it serves as an assertion of a people’s will, the projection or the imagining of an alternative life that appeals to what is best in the spirit of their kind.

The myth can be about the Second Coming of Christ or about the General Strike of the syndicalists. What’s important is that the myth condenses and amalgamates the beliefs of its believers into a single compelling image to overwhelm every category opposing it.

As an unconscious but compelling force, myth as such justifies a people, it explains why they differ from other people, it affirms them in their right to assert themselves as who they are, it defines them and their friends, just as it distinguishes them from their enemies. One might even follow Schelling in believing that myth is what founds a people as a community of consciousness.

Because it arises from a people’s conviction and experience (some of which go back to Homer), it has nothing to do with Utopian or ideological plans for what should be or can be.

Myth is indeed not a description of things or a rational alternative to the present, but an expression of a determination to act.

To use a religious term (though it is not necessarily about religion), myth has an eschatological role to play, for it refers to the Final Days, to “ultimate and last things,” to that coming catastrophic collision between the forces of good and evil. This makes it a matter of faith—the faith of those who believe that no matter how grim or disappointing the present may be, their cause and their kind are bound to triumph once the moment of decision strikes—because their cause and their kind await a higher destiny than the negative one their enemies would have them follow.

This faith is what imbues the myth’s believers with the willingness to make great sacrifices, even to die, for their beliefs—these same people who would normally never go out of their way for an idea, a political project, or a theory.

Those in the grip of a great myth—Irish nationalists in communion with Pearse’s Blood Sacrifice, 16th-century Calvinists convinced of their Predestination—such peoples, through the force that myth exerts on their character, acquire the power to make history.

But lacking such a captivating myth, there can be no history-changing movement.

In this context, The Occidental Quarterly may play a role in educating active minorities in the tradition they inherit, which is crucial to any future organization or tendency representing the white nationalist movement, but without a myth that grips the white masses and instills in them a sense of historical meaning, there will be no National Revolution.

At this point, the question inevitably arises: What myth could possibly capture the imagination of the white masses and instill in them the enthusiasm for a white homeland?

Unfortunately, there’s no way to know. A myth cannot be rationally constructed and imposed on a people.

It cannot even become self-conscious, for once it is seen as a myth it ceases to work.

By nature, a myth grows out of a people’s life, speaks to the sense they have of themselves, and becomes their movement’s rationale.

But after saying this, I nevertheless think it’s safe to claim that the white nationalist myth will have little to do with IQ scores, black crime rates, Jewish malfeasance, or the superiority of European culture (though it will likely have much to do with the anti-white practices that have come with the colored invasion of the white homelands). To the degree any of these issues have the capacity to move the white masses, I suspect it will be in conjunction with whatever myth ends up capturing their imagination. For however important, these things in themselves are not the stuff of myth.

No one can predict, then, what the founding myth of a white nationalist movement will be.

But speaking personally, I know that I myself am already in the grips of a powerful myth—the myth of what I call the White Republic.

Other possible myths probably exist or will come to exist.

But for me it’s the White Republic that evokes the total captivating image of what we are about as a movement.

I recently wrote: “The prospect of an independent white homeland in North America, free of the Jew-ridden US government, with its colored multitudes and parasitic institutions: This one image says everything, explains everything, promises everything.”

Why? Because the myth of a White Republic means secession from the United States. As such, it implies an all-white national community, which, in turn, would mean a total rejection of the existing blood-sucking system of cultural-racial chaos that shames us and causes us to hate the world in which we have to live.

At the same time, the myth of a White Republic implies an end to miscegenation, to affirmative action, to the rising tide of color. But above all, the image of the White Republic implies a regeneration of our people, reborn from principles of self-assertion, self-interest, self-determination, and sovereignty.

I believe all these implications, which the image of a White Republic awakens in us, are the stuff of myth, for, in my mind at least, its image says everything, explains everything, promises everything.

The Occidental Quarterly will, of course, continue to validate the demonstrated truths that inspire the white nationalist project, the truths whose criterion is life, not bloodless reason. But what we white nationalists await most impatiently is the moment when our people begin to take inspiration from their own myths.

For if the white man should ever believe in his myths, in his self, again, then, at that point, all the diseased and contemptible human offshoots of late 20th-century American degradation, whose culminating abomination is the existing System, will at last be forced, as the wheel of history turns, to flee the wrath of the reborn people.

It’s images of this sort, I believe, that will shape the white nationalist myth.

Toward the White Republic

Or:

The United States can only be repulsed
as an alien body-snatcher

The below essay, “Toward the White Republic” by Michael O’Meara, won in 2009 The Occidental Quarterly essay contest on secession. It is now the title essay of O’Meara’s book Toward the White Republic, available from Counter-Currents Publishing here.

Young Irish warrior

“Breathes there the man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land!”

—Walter Scott

One.

Some time in the second half of the 1990s, a terminologi­cal change occurred in the racially conscious community.

Many who previously identified themselves as White Power advocates, segregationists, separatists, supremacists, survivalists, neo-Confederates, biological realists, etc. started calling themselves “white nationalists.”

At the time (and I didn’t know much about these things then), I thought this reflected a changing political con­sciousness.

For what began after 1945 as a “movement” to maintain the integrity of America’s racial character and prevent alien races from intruding into its various “life worlds” had, by the 1990s, ceased to be a realistic project—30 years of Third-World immigration, “civil rights” legislation, and various measures imposed by the federal government to subordinate white interests to those of non-whites had ir­revocably transformed the American people so that it was increasingly difficult to characterize it any longer as a majority-white population.

For this reason, “white advocates” in the late 1990s started making traditional nationalist claims for secession and self-determination because the United States, in their eyes, had become a threat to their people’s existence.

Two.

This interpretation was not at all unreasonable. But, alas, it didn’t quite accord with the facts.

I’ve since learned that those calling themselves “white nationalists” are not necessarily nationalists in the sense of wanting to secede from the United States in order to form an independent ethnostate. Most, I think it’s fair to say, are racially conscious conservatives who want to work through the existing institutions to regain control of the country their ancestors made—in order, ultimately, to dismantle the present anti-white system of preferences and restore something of the white man’s former hegemony.

By contrast, white nationalists in the strict sense (i.e., those favoring secession) have no interest in restoring the old ways, let alone regaining control of the central state, whose authority is already slipping and whose rule is in­creasingly dysfunctional. Indeed, the American state sys­tem, as its more astute supporters acknowledge, is beyond reform.

Instead, white nationalists aspire to create a counter-elite to lead disaffected white youth in a movement to found a whites-only nation-state somewhere in North America, once the poorly managed enterprise known as the United States collapses in a centrifugal dispersion of its decaying and perverted powers.

Without an organizational presence in the real world and a “public” largely of computer hobbyists, white na­tionalists have no hope at present of actually mobilizing whites in opposition to the existing anti-white regime (even if they seek to influence whatever social currents might run in their general direction). Rather, their immedi­ate goal is to prepare the way for the development of a revolutionary nationalist vanguard to lead the struggle for white liberation. They aspire thus not to recapture the rot­ting corpse of the US government, but to free themselves from it—in order to be themselves, in their own land, in their own way.

White nationalists, as such, politically define themselves in wanting to create a sovereign state in North America. They endeavor, therefore, not to “put things back the way they were,” as conservatives wish, but to rid themselves of them completely.

A National Revolution, they hold, will alone restore “the white man to his rightful place in the world.”

Inspired by the birthright handed down by the blood and sacrifice of ancestors, their project, relatedly, is not about restoring the Third Reich or the Confederacy, as left­ists imagine, but about creating a future white homeland in which their kind will be able “to pursue their destiny with­out interference from other races.”

Three.

White nationalism is a variant of historic ethnonational­ism, what Walker Connor calls nationalism “in its pristine sense.”

All three—racial, ethno, and pristine nationalism—de­fine the nation in terms of blood.

The creedal or civic nationalism of the present regime, which makes loyalty to the state, not the nation, primary, is by contrast “nationalist” only in a narrow ideological sense, confusing as it does patriotism (loyalty to the state or affection for the land) with loyalty to the people (nationalism). It thus de­fines the nation in terms of certain abstract democratic principles, seeing it as a collection of individuals, each more important than the whole.

Though ethnonationalists privilege the nation’s spirit above all else, they nevertheless define it organically, in terms of blood, as an extended family, an endogamous kin group, or a genetic commonwealth.

Unlike European nations, formed around long-established ethnic cores (which had developed in the Middle Ages, as Germanic and other tribal confederations evolved into larger political, regional, and cultural identities), American national identity was defined, historically, in ex­plicitly racial terms.

As Sir Arthur Keith characterized it: “In Europe the stock has been broken up into local national breeds; in America the local breeds have been reunited.”

In both cases, a national identity grew out of a real or imagined blood relationship linking the nation’s members to inherited customs and institutions.

Because the American form of racial nationhood lacks the ethnic dimension distinct to European nationalism, it is a source of some misunderstanding, especially in its purely negative expression as anti-Semitism or Negrophobia.

For example, even Euronationalists who struggle for a continental nation-state tend to dismiss white nationalism —because it seems to imply the typical American leveling of cultural and other identities by subsuming them under a homogenizing biological concept that negates the particularisms of European nationhood and subjects them to an­other form of Anglo-American hegemony.

In this, however, our European cousins misunderstand the aim of white nationalism, though some white national­ists in their one-sided reaction to non-whites or in their “numbskull Americanism” may, admittedly, have given cause to this misunderstanding

White nationalism is a distinctly American (or, better said, New World) nationalism, not a European one, and the two are analogous only at the highest level, where the na­tional community, defined ethnically or racially, affirms its right to control its own destiny. Its highest loyalty, as Fran­cis Parker Yockey held, is to the destiny of its mother soil and father culture: Europe.

This is not to say that American racial nationalism—which makes white European racial ascriptions the basis of American identity—has no ethnic or historic component.

The country’s original settlers were largely of Anglo-Protestant descent, and this had a formative effect on American institutions and folkways.

The organic basis of the American nation, however, was less English ethnicity than “whiteness.”

Even before the War of Independence (the first Ameri­can war of secession), more than a quarter of the popula­tion was of non-English, mainly North European stock: Scots-Irish, German, Dutch, French Huguenots, etc. By about the mid-18th century, the “American English” were increasingly referred to as “Americans,” a people “selected by a whole series of ordeals which [had] killed off the weak and worthless” and conferred a distinct vitality on their laws, attitudes, and local institutions.

The bitterness of the War of Independence and the War of 1812, US-British acrimony and rivalry extending late into the 19th century, in addition to the “normal” nationalist compulsion to celebrate an American identity independent of the English—all tended to minimize the significance of the colonists’ original national origins, as they were reborn as pure Americans.

American nationalism arose in fact on the basis of a cer­tain popular revulsion against the English.

Nevertheless, English-Americans were the original na­tive Americans, and all the rest of us have since become American by assimilating something of the ethos derived from their unique genos.

Though Anglo-Protestant ethnicity continues to animate the inner reaches of American culture, it wasn’t the phenotypical basis of American identity. Rather, it was the ra­cial experience of transplanted Englishmen in 17th-century Virginia, then the “exotic far western periphery… of the metropolitan European cultural system.”

In the New World part of this system, the ever-looming presence of African slaves, considered “by nature vicious and morally inferior,” and “savage” red Indians, who posed an ongoing threat, could not but foster an acute ra­cial consciousness.

Given that economic opportunities, vast expanses of vir­gin land, and new fortunes prevented the old European so­cial hierarchies from re-establishing themselves, these ra­cial bearings would serve as the one fixed hierarchy or­dering colonial life.

Forged, thus, in conflict with non-whites, the colonists’ early racial consciousness served to mark the boundaries of the emerging American identity. The historian Winthrop Jordan claims that “Anglo-Americans” were already identi­fying themselves as “whites” rather than “Englishmen” as early as 1680.

National or ethnic differences in this racially mixed en­vironment were simply less meaningful than differences between Europeans and non-Europeans.

These differences were subsequently institutionalized, once the American colonists declared their independence, for they declared in effect their intent to become a self-determined people in the evolutionary sense, by becoming a nation, an organic body with its own sovereign state and its own laws of growth.

Then, following the revolution, as republican principles were gradually extended to all white males, the country’s Herrenvolk democracy posed an insurmountable obstacle to the extension of these principles to non-whites—for the new, explicitly white nation was based not on the liberal fiction of “humanity,” but on the assumption that human nature is a product of blood and race.

Indeed, the white egalitarianism of the early republic, shaped largely in opposition to the Toryism of anglophile Federalists (who represented the bourgeois interests of lib­eral market society and its connection to British commerce) was premised on the Negro’s otherness and the primacy of white racial ascriptions, all of which further contributed to the nation’s self-consciousness, coherence, and communal­ity, as British and European Americans, largely under the leadership of Indian-fighting, pro-slavery, and expansionist Southerners, came to share not just the same horizontal sense of right and identity, but the same vertical qualities and dignities of their racial stock.

In ways different from ethnicity, race formed the psy­chological bonds that joined American whites and differ­entiated them from non-whites, just as the language, cus­toms, and early institutions of the original Anglo-Protestant settlers established the cultural-linguistic framework in which white Americans became a self-conscious nation.

Four.

The ethnogenic process that gradually imposed a com­mon culture and identity on the former colonists, as they became Virginians and New Englanders, and more gener­ally, Americans, was interrupted in the 1840s by the mass influx of Irish and German Catholics—the former seen al­most as an alien race. Then, in the late 19th century, this was followed by a second great immigrant wave, from Southern and Eastern Europe.

Today the Third World invasion is taking the ethnogenic process to a new extreme, as the state, with its inorganic definition of the nation, endeavors to “transcend” the per­ennially white, Christian character of the American people for the sake of its oxymoronic “universal nation.”

At each nodal point in this demographic transformation, except the most recent, native Americans, however resis­tant to the newcomers, succeeded in assimilating them on the basis of their racial ascriptions, as the Anglo-Protestant character of American identity became progressively more “ecumenical.”

Indeed, it’s increasingly difficult today to talk of “hy­phenated-Americans,” given that the different European ethnic strains making up the white population have so ex­tensively intermarried that many now no longer know their ethnic origins, European hybrids that they have become. As one historian writes: “Ellis Island whiteness” has come to replace “Plymouth Rock whiteness.”

There were obvious limits to assimilation, though. As Woodrow Wilson put it: “We cannot make a homogenous population of a people who do not blend with the Cauca­sian race.” Against this view, many “new,” especially Jew­ish immigrants, advanced the cause for greater ra­cial/ethnic diversity, as if America’s vocation was to be­come a boardinghouse to all the world’s peoples. The Old America, though, would have none of this, and, in Stoddard’s words, dismissed such claims with the insis­tence “that America is basically ‘made’—and that it shall not be unmade.”

Then, later, when the post-1945 National Security State, armed with its newly acquired “mandate of heaven,” en­deavored to turn Roosevelt’s liberal-managerial state sys­tem into a world empire, premised on the belief that it was based on an idea, not a people, it launched what amounted to an assault on America’s historic identity—an assault whose overarching aim was to undermine the population’s racial consciousness and promote ethnocidal practices fa­cilitating its “demographic” reconstitution.

The state’s “anti-racism” came thus to serve as an in­strument of its social engineers, who sought to turn whites into herds of “tamed sheep [who] care not in which flock [they] are driven.”

It was only natural, therefore, that once the shearing got under way the most racially conscious whites began to see themselves as an oppressed nation in need of their own sovereign state.

Five.

Numerous have been the criticisms that racial conser­vatives make of nationalists advocating secession from the United States. The most common of these—made in a pe­riod which has witnessed successful secessionist move­ments (in the former SU, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, etc.), as well as other popular movements resisting a despotic, leveling centralization in the name of regionalism, devo­lution, and the defense of historic identities—is that the prospect of creating a white ethnostate in North America free of the United States is totally unrealizable… a fantasy… pure and utter folly.

But this, they fail to realize, is hardly criticism at all.

For those with the courage of their convictions, it’s never a matter of calculating the odds and going with the win­ning side, but of doing what needs to be done—like that Roman soldier cited by Spengler in Man and Technics, whose Aryan sense of duty kept him at his post, doing what had to be done, as Pompeii was buried in the ash of Vesuvius.

The secessionist, then, is not another party politician loyal to Washington’s New Class establishment, but a na­tionalist loyal to his nation—and thus to whatever political imperative the nation’s welfare demands.

He has, moreover, no illusions about what this entails.

As the Euronationalist Jean Thiriart put it: “One does not create a nation with speeches, pious talk, and banquets. One creates a nation with rifles, martyrs, jointly lived dan­gers.”

Six.

Viewed “objectively,” neither secession nor a white con­servative reconquest has a chance, not one in a universe of infinite possibilities. Both are figments of a few white minds troubled by the prospect of their people’s imminent demise.

But that’s the way all great movements begin.

If a presently unattainable ideal is not first articulated as a mythic possibility, it remains unrealized, for its idealiza­tion is part of the process that quickens its realization (sic volo, sic jubeo).

In 1774, only a few believed in American independence, but after 1776 it was a critical mass.

Secession, as such, cannot be submitted to the usual criticism, for it’s not a fact or even an idea so much as it is a way of being—or of wanting to be.

Central to its realization, therefore, is not the objective forces opposing it, but the subjective will seeking its triumph—the triumph which comes, as Evola says, whenever “a heroic vocation awakens as an irresistible force from above and… is animated by a will to keep on going, over­coming every material or rational obstacle.”

Many things, of course, would have to change before either secession or reconquest are remotely realizable (though our postmodern age, the Kali Yuga of the Tradi­tionalists, is an interregnum in which time and events are greatly accelerated, as all things hurtle toward the inevita­ble crackup, the Ragnarok, which precedes every rebirth).

The thought, nevertheless, of whites breaking free of the United States, in this period when the multi-cult empire is experiencing what may be the first of its death agonies, seems, from a secessionist perspective, somewhat less of a fantasy than trying to reform it, which 60 years of ex­perience suggest is unreformable.

Seven.

Almost every criticism that can be made of secession is to be found in Sam Francis’s “Prospects for Racial and Cultural Survival” (1995).

Sam, to whom I have paid high tribute in these pages [Chechar's note: The Occidental Quarterly], was an important transitional figure in the devel­opment of white nationalism.

Though one of his feet was solidly planted in the racial­ist camp, the other, however, was never quite freed from his former “new right” and paleocon beliefs. Divided, his critique of secession reflected an old-fashioned patriotism unwilling to break with the US—though, perhaps, if he had lived, he might feel differently, now that the dusky helms­man has begun steering the ship of state perilously close to the shoals of what promises to be an even more horrendous fate.

As an anti-secessionist, Sam considered separation from the United States tantamount to surrender—surrender of the country his ancestors created, surrender of its history, traditions, interests.

But Sam was wrong.

Secessionists surrender nothing but the slow death of their people. For among other things, secession is about survival—and the prospect of being able to fight another day.

To do that, one must live. But where, how?

For all practical purposes whites have lost the United States. Though still a near majority, they are surrounded by armed forces seeking their destruction, they are running out of ammunition, and the ground troops are being sent in to clean up the remaining pockets of resistance. It looks as if they’re doomed.

Secession is a way of avoiding the deadly pincers closing in on white life. It is perhaps the only way.

In the last 60 years, it bears emphasizing, absolutely NOTHING—not one little thing—has been accomplished to interrupt the programmed destruction of European America.

Nevertheless, the critics of secession drone on: “Why give up the country when you can take it back?”

These two-fisted patriots, who think this is the most powerful argument against secession, are likely to be sing­ing the same song in the not too distanced future, when colored novelists start writing about “The Last of the Euro­peans.”

But even if feasible, what self-respecting white man would want to take back the United States, this monstrous, bureaucratic Leviathan whose Jewish, race-mixing, homo­phile, feminist, fraudulent, anti-Christian, and degenerate practices stand as an affront to everything his ancestors stood for?

The hard truth is that it’s gotten to the point where the US can no longer be defended as “my mother, drunk or so­ber,” only repulsed as an alien body-snatcher. [Chechar's note: for an explanation of this metaphor, see this article.]

To this end, secessionists emulate the proud Danes, who said after the loss of Schleswig-Holstein in 1865: “What has been lost externally will be gained internally.”

But more than refusing to abide the state responsible for their dispossession, secessionists see this “abomination of desolation” as their principal enemy. Only by freeing themselves from it and acquiring their own land under their own sovereignty do they see a future for their kind.

One might call this “surrendering large parts of the country to non-whites”—though these aliens already oc­cupy large parts of it and will continue to do so until whites are completely replaced.

The secessionists’ ultimate consideration, then, is not what will be lost, but what gives whites the best chance to survive.

“Any proposal for separation,” Sam argued, “would simply alienate the most patriotic and nationalist loyalties of American whites and lead them to see separatists as un-American.” Most whites would also “refuse to abandon their allegiance to the US or forsake its territory.”

Here Sam confused loyalty to the state with loyalty to the nation, paying tribute, in effect, to Caesar in his own coin. One cannot wonder, moreover, how patriotic most Americans are going to be once they discover that their grandchildren will be paying off the debts of the present US government—at a time when American citizenship is likely to be little more than a form of Chinese peonage.

Secessionists care not in the least if most whites would refuse to abandon “their” country. Most whites, de-Ayranized as they are, allowed a Negro to become president.

Only those who care for their kind and are willing to fight for them can possibly found a new nation.

The flag-waving, Constitution-worshipping types—who know nothing outside the ideology of liberal democracy, old (“conservative”) or new (“progressive”), and who be­lieve that there is something sacred about the unholy United States—will never be mobilized for the sake of “ra­cial preservation”; that ship has sailed.

In secessionist eyes, it’s better to lose a bit of territory and shed the race’s detritus than to lose whatever remains of the white nation—especially in view of the coming age, which is certain to be filled with cascading catastrophes, set off by the imploding contradictions of liberalism’s dysto­pian regime.

As for being militarily crushed by the US, another fre­quent objection, anti-secessionists seem not to have heard of fourth-generation war, just as they conveniently forget that the only country the United States has truly defeated in the many wars of choice it’s waged in the last 60 years is the tiny Caribbean nation of Grenada. As one Russian observer notes, the US “military does not know how to win… [only] how to blow things up” (a Second Generation Warfare practice which the US Army learned from the French in WW I and continues to teach in its academies, as it justifies the Pentagon’s vast budgetary appropriations). It’s consequentially incapable of “prevailing over any en­emy, no matter how badly armed, demoralized, or minus­cule”—because it only knows how to fight standing armies in “conventional” wars, where firepower is paramount.

Both militarily and politically, it would seem a hundred times easier to secede from, than to retake, the United States. Concentrating their forces at the enemy’s weakest link—a concentration of what would be a growing base of support, once the United States starts its slow slide into the abyss of insolvency and tyranny—secessionists would need only to pene­trate the enemy’s porous lines, disorganize his rear through an “open-source insurgency,” and then sue for formal sov­ereignty over a collapsed or ungovernable part of the United States.

In the context of such a possible development, Sam wondered how the races could possibly be separated and what would prevent them from “unseparating.” Here again he didn’t see what was coming. Since the end of the Second World War there have been numerous population transfers by partitioned states (the most important of which were sanctioned by the US). These transfers occurred in the recent past, will undoubtedly occur again, and already oc­cur in little ways every day in the US, as non-whites force whites out of their former neighborhoods.

Secession implies both population transfers and territo­rial partition—historically justifiable measures, sanctioned by US precedent, and executable with a minimum of force, unlike the pipe dreams of anti-secessionists, whose imag­ined “reconquest” would be of a state with a hundred mil­lion non-white citizens, all with their hands out.

In its desire for cheap labor, Sam thought a separate white nation, would simply repeat the process that got whites into the present mess—as if the struggle for seces­sion (and all it entails) wouldn’t lead to an explicitly racial definition of nationality, to an inversion of the market’s primacy, and to a spiritual triumph over the materialism that has corrupted so many whites.

As a conservative, he couldn’t see that white secession (unlike the secession of the Confederacy) is a revolutionary project premised on a rejection not just of the illegal alien­ations of the federal government, but of the entire social, economic, and moral order sustaining its ethnocidal rule.

A white breakaway state, Sam also claimed, would be surrounded by hostile powers, vulnerable to invasion, and unable to defend itself against the rising demographic tide outside its borders. Again, these are non-criticisms. Any region seceded from the United States would have its own arms stockpile, including nukes, and would likely be sup­ported by Russia and other powers having scores to settle with Washington’s New World Order.

More crucially, the racially homogenous populace of a seceded white republic would be imbued with the nation­alist fervor that is the inevitable offshoot of newly forged nations and armed not simply with the technologies of mass destruction, which are now accessible to small states, but also with a society-wide system of local militias, like the Swiss.

To think that a mutilated United States, with its warring racial factions, welfare politics, and rubber-spine army would be able to crush an armed, autonomous white re­public is to abandon the realm of logic. Even at the height of its expansionist powers, National Socialist Germany never thought of invading tiny, mountainous Switzerland, where every citizen was armed and ready to defend his nation. The US Army, need it be said, is no Wehrmacht.

Eight.

European Americans will not survive another genera­tion under the present Judeo-Negro regime.

Racially-conscious conservatives are counting on a fu­ture white backlash to mobilize in defense of white inter­ests. Through such a mobilization, and a much discussed though little practiced, “march through the institu­tions,” they hope to raise white racial consciousness, counter the demographic threat posed by non-whites, and introduce reforms that will curtail non-white power—all of which, of course, are totally desirable.

But they expect to arrive at this Utopia without ex­plaining how they would counter a population half of which will be non-white in 33 years (2042); with­out explaining how they would challenge a government that criminalizes white dissent; without explaining how a system can be fundamentally changed without fundamen­tally changing the institutions and powers that govern it and make it what it is; without any of these things, racial conservatives mock the notion of secession, as if their own not particularly successful project is the sole conceivable alternative.

Nine.

Unlike their conservative critics, secessionists have a plan, a simple, straightforward one, that offers whites an alternative to an unreformable system and an inescapable death.

This plan has the advantage of being (a) eminently po­litical, (b) based on proven historical precedents, and (c) imbued with the power to generate a will to nationhood.

Given the increasingly totalitarian nature of the existing system, where the mere mention of “race” can be taken as an incitement to crimes against humanity, this aspect of se­cession, ought, perhaps, to be discussed in historical rather than explicitly programmatic terms.

Much of the history of European nationalism speaks to the American situation today, especially (in my admittedly partisan view) Irish nationalism.

In the 1870s and ’80s, a generation after the An Gorta Mor (the Great Hunger), revolutionary and conservative na­tionalists agreed to be allies in the common struggle for Irish nationhood. The revolutionary Fenians, preeminently in the form of Michael Davitt’s Land League, which led the rebellion in the countryside, gave the constitutionalists in Charles Stewart Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party the social leverage to force concessions from the English at Westminster—con­cessions that eventually won back many Irish lands. Then, once the constitutionalists had gone as far as they could, by about 1911 or so, the revolutionary, physical-force wing of Irish nationalism took over to complete the nationalist project.

We American secessionists want whatever works best for the future of our people. If our “constitutionalists,” per­haps in the form of a third party, are able to create dissen­sion and vulnerability among the “English” in a way that promotes white interests, they are to be supported. But once they fail, we will need to turn, as did the Irish, to the methods of Connelly and Pearse.

Those who know Hibernian—or any other European—nationalist history also know the immeasurable power of the nation, especially the nation rising to nationhood.

This is the spirit we secessionists hope to stir in white Americans.

The situation today may, therefore, be totally grim, but politically there is no more feasible or marketable strategy to awaken our people, especially as they become aware of their approaching minority status and all it implies.

Imagine, then, for a moment, a white homeland in North America, free of the Jew-ridden US government, with its colored multitudes and parasitic institutions: In my mind, this one image says everything, explains everything, promises everything.

The powerful imagery of an autonomous white nation possesses, as well, the mythic potential that the General Strike has in the thought of Georges Sorel.

All great movements, Sorel saw, are driven not by ra­tional arguments or party programs, but by their myths (which “are not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act”).

For it is myth—and the memories and hopes animating it—that shape a nation, that turn a “motley horde” into a people with a shared sense of purpose and identity, that mobilize them against the state of things, and prepare them for self-sacrifice and self-rule.

A Sovereign Independent State, as the Irish called it in 1916—the White Republic, as I call it—is a possible seces­sionist myth to symbolize the determination of white men to assert themselves as a free people somewhere in an all-white America.

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See endnotes here.